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While the meaning of lines 31-32 of Fragment 1 (DK 1.31-32) in Parmenides’ epic-style poem 
seem to have significant implications for the overall argument of the poem, attempts to 
understand them have resulted in generations of interpretative deadlock.  After considering the 
problem, I argue that the best way to make sense of these lines in relation to the overall poem 
is to hold that Parmenides consistently holds mortal opinions in low-regard, and that the third 
section of the poem (Opinion) should be far more limited in scope than has been traditionally 
thought.  Not only is this negative reading preferable on the traditional arrangement of the 
poem, but the case for it is significantly strengthened on certain suggested rearrangements of 
the poem—rearrangements which are strongly supported independently of any interpretative 
commitments. 
 In what follows, readers will first find: a) an introduction to the overall poem, b) a survey 
and analysis of the variant Greek texts and modern translations of lines 31-32, and c) an 
explication of the primary interpretative dilemma modern commentators face in interpreting 
these lines.  This provides both an in-depth summary and review of the literature on this 
particular topic, filling an important lacuna in the literature.   
 With these considerations in hand, the essay will turn to its secondary aim—considering 
how the interpretative dilemma might best be resolved.  The relevant challenges for both 
positive and negative readings are considered under the traditional ordering (Diels-Kranz) of 
the poem.  Having established the negative reading of lines 1.31-32 to be preferable on the 
traditional arrangement, several recently proposed rearrangements are considered, in terms of 
iv 
what impacts the arguments for their respective changes to the poem, if acceptable, might 
have for our understanding of these problematic lines and the negative reading.  Again, it is 
concluded that the particular arguments for rearrangement that are considered can only aid 
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a)ll' e1mphj kai\ tau~ta maqh&seai, w(j ta_ dokou~nta 
xrh~n doki/mwj ei]nai dia_ panto_j pa&nta per o)/nta 
 
“But nevertheless, you will also learn these things—how the things accepted to be,  
acceptably ought to have been accepted:  all things, altogether, just as beings.” 
 
--Parmenides, On Nature (DK 1.31-32) 
 
Part I:  Introduction 
 Given the fragmentary nature of the extant Pre-Socratic texts, the relatively few lines 
we do have often end up bearing a far greater interpretative burden than they should.  This is 
particularly the case for Fragment 1, lines 31-32 (DK 1.31-32)—the generally accepted 
conclusion to the Proem of Parmenides’ sole known work, On Nature (PERI FUSEWS).1  In 
conjunction with the three lines immediately antecedent, we seem to have a programmatic 
outline for the overall text, which has traditionally been understood to be linear in sequence.  
Since so much of the latter text is missing, these final lines in the proem could prove to be the 
main textual source for understanding the overall structure and philosophical thrust of the text.  
Unfortunately, the meaning of lines 31-32 themselves is far from clear.  
 A close reading of the textual evidence quickly reveals that one cannot base 
interpretative views of these lines solely upon the Greek itself:   there is at least one major 
variance in the textual transmission; the grammar is abstruse; the forms and syntax allow for 
                                                          
1
 I say “generally accepted” here because there is some question as to whether it is correct to take these lines, 
transmitted by Simplicius, as the correct ending of the Proem. Wherever these lines, or any other lines/fragments, 
should ultimately belong in the poem, I will consistently refer to the fragments and their lines by the traditional 
numbering from Diels-Kranz (DK).  This introductory line also assumes, of course, that Parmenides did only write 
one cohesive work that has been transmitted through fragmented quotations.  If one were able to demonstrate 
that Parmenides wrote several distinct works that have been conflated, rather simple solutions to the tensions 
addressed below might be had.  However, I do not see how such an argument could be persuasive, given the 
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2 
very different readings; and the referents are ambiguous.  Thus, interpretative readings of 
these lines tend to be largely influenced by other textual evidence and philosophical 
considerations, both internal and external to the text.  However, since these lines themselves 
might happen to be the only extant evidence undercutting any particular interpretation in the 
first place, concerns that we may be led astray by circular reasoning and/or anachronistic 
analyses are well-founded.  The lack of any obvious or unproblematic way forward here has 
resulted in pervasive and persistent disagreement amongst interpreters.  Nevertheless, these 
lines must be engaged by any serious interpretative endeavor.2   
 Since understanding what exactly DK 1.31-32 says in the context of the overall poem 
must come before any overall interpretative considerations of the poem, the first aim of this 
essay is to provide: a) an introduction to the overall poem, b) a survey and analysis of the 
variant Greek texts and modern translations of lines 31-32, and c) an explication of the primary 
interpretative dilemma modern commentators face in interpreting these lines in relation to the 
                                                          
2
 They must be dealt with even if one takes the rare view that these lines are not genuine.  For example, Tarrant 
argues that due to the lack of attestation by later thinkers— especially those whose own interpretative views could 
have been far better supported by including these lines (i.e. Neo-Platonists)—along with the non-epic contractions 
in the participles, there is good reason to doubt their veracity.  Instead, Tarrant suggests, they were in fact added 
to the prologue by even later Neo-Platonists, based upon their prior interpretative commitments of the poem.  
Harold Tarrant “The Conclusion of Parmenides’ Poem,” Apeiron 17.1 (1983):  73-84.  While Tarrant is correct to 
point out the paucity of attestation by later thinkers, there are alternative possibilities for this lacking (e.g. simple 
historical accident, or ancient commentators did not know what to do with the lines any more than modern 
commentators, and so omitted them consciously).  Furthermore, questioning the sole source of these lines 
(Simplicius) would also seem to warrant calling into question a number of other lines for which Simplicius is the 
only source, or the only one who provides any guidance for placement of the fragments.  In any case, this essay 
will proceed on the brute assumption that lines 31-32 are in fact genuine lines from Parmenides (even if their 
placement may be debatable), on the basis that Simplicius is a reliable source, while acknowledging Tarrant’s 
challenge as a logically possible, albeit unpersuasive, alternative to dealing with these puzzling lines.  One must 
also make sense of these lines even if one wants to agree with Kurfess—that Parmenides resorted to the sort of 
repetition found in other epic poetry, and claim that these lines actually come later in the poem (favoring Sextus’ 
version of the entire Proem, which provides Fragment 1.1-30, then jumps to the current Frag. 7.2-7). Christopher 
John Kurfess,  Restoring Parmenides’ Poem:  Essays Towards a New Arrangement of the Fragments Based on a 
Reassessment of the Original Sources, Doctoral Dissertation (Ann Arbor:  University of Pittsburgh, Proquest/UMI) 
2012.  (Publication No. [3537944]). 
 
3 
overall poem.  This provides both an in-depth summary and review of the literature on this 
particular topic, filling an important lacuna in the literature.   
 With these considerations in hand, the essay will turn to its secondary aim—considering 
how this interpretative dilemma might best be resolved.  To address this issue, I first consider 
the challenges each view faces on the traditional arrangement of the poem, and evaluate which 
one on balance seems preferable.  Next, several recent arguments which challenge the 
orthodox reconstruction of the Parmenides’ poem are considered, both in terms of: a) what 
impacts these changes—if acceptable—might have for our understanding of these problematic 
lines, and b) whether they are convincing modifications commentators should accept. 
 The reasoning for considering rearrangements of the poem here is simple.  First, if we 
find ourselves in persistent aporia—such as the persistent interpretative dilemma over DK 1. 
31-32—it is often a result of our failure to question some basic (yet ultimately mistaken) 
assumption(s).  Since the fragmentary nature of the text itself is clearly the greatest obstacle 
Parmenidean scholars face, some of our problematic assumptions may very well lie in accepting 
the orthodox reconstruction of the poem, and challenging these assumptions might prove more 
fruitful than simply rehashing the interpretative dilemma on already well-trodden grounds.  
Second, not only do these recent proposals for rearrangement largely await critical treatment 
in the literature on their own merits, the arguments for them stop short of extensive 
consideration of how they might affect interpretations of the poem overall, especially in terms 
of understanding DK 1.31-32.  These are questions well-worth considering. 
 Ultimately, it will be concluded that the “negative” reading of lines DK 1.31-32 and the 
status of Opinion is preferable to the more “positive” reading--even on the traditional 
4 
arrangement.  However, it remains understandable that some will remain unconvinced of the 
negative reading in the face of an (apparently) extensive Opinion, with passages that can 
certainly seem to present some positive account.  This is where the arguments for 
rearrangement can be helpful.  Once these arguments (or at least certain parts of them) are 
understood and accepted, and it is recognized how they:  a) emphasize the applicability of the 
conclusions in Truth to Opinion, and b) imply that a more restricted understanding of the scope 
and content of Opinion is warranted—then the “negative” reading of lines 31-32 becomes even 
more attractive than the orthodox reconstruction has suggested.   
Introduction to Parmenides’ Poem (Orthodox Arrangement) 
 The extant 154 lines of Parmenides’ fragmentary epic poem are traditionally divided 
into three sections, arranged in the following linear order—Proem, Truth, and Opinion.  
However, the ordering, connectedness, and completeness of each section decreases drastically, 
as the text is generally thought to unfold.   
 Uncontroversially, the majority of the lines traditionally assigned to the Proem (DK 1.1-
30) come first, having been explicitly reported to be the beginning, and quoted together, by 
Sextus Empiricus.  This section is considered complete (or nearly so) with the addition of lines 
31-32 from a different source (Simplicius).3  Overall, the lines all seem to tell a coherent story, 
without any noticeable gaps.  In this section, the reader is presented with a mythical account of 
                                                          
3
 While Sextus alone quotes lines 1-27 altogether, and while Lines 28-30 are reported by several additional sources 
(Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Clement, and Proclus), Simplicius alone cites lines 31-32 (following two lines that are 
nearly identical to lines 28-30 from Sextus).  Sextus, however, continues on after line 30 with lines from the current 
Frag 7.2-7.  Clearly, if we are to accept lines 31-32 as genuinely belonging here in the Proem, and deny Sextus’ 
report that 1.30 is followed by 7.2, then Sextus did not provide the complete Proem, but made a large jump 
forward in the poem.  This recognition leaves room to think there may still be further lines that properly belong to 
this section, providing some additional support for Bicknell’s argument for the placement of Frag. 10 immediately 
after lines 31-32.  P. J. Bicknell, “Parmenides’ Fragment 10,” Hermes 46 (1968) 629-31. 
5 
a young man traveling along an ethereal and/or cosmic path,, which is often considered 
autobiographical of Parmenides’ own journey towards philosophical enlightenment.  Likely 
ending up in the underworld, the youth has come to learn the truth about reality from (a 
likewise unnamed) goddess. Upon his arrival, the goddess welcomes the youth, and then 
appears to provide a programmatic outline of what is to be discussed in the poem: 
 “…And it is necessary for you to learn all things,     (28b) 
 Both the still heart of persuasive truth, 
 And the opinions of mortals, in which there is no trustworthy persuasion.4 (30) 
 
That the youth is supposed to learn the truth about reality (DK 1.29) is also uncontroversial, and 
traditionally understood to be satisfied by DK 2-8.49, which comprise the second major section 
of the poem, commonly referred to as ‘Truth’.  
 Assigning these particular fragments to Truth is well-grounded, and internal consistency 
highly recommends the particular ordering of the fragments mentioned above (or at least 
something very similar). 5  The bulk of this traditionally-formulated section (DK 7-8) was quoted 
                                                          
4
 xrew_ de/ se pa&nta puqe/sqai, h)me\n  0Alhqei/hj eu)peiqe/oj a)treme\j h}tor, h)de\ brotw~n do&caj, tai=j ou)k e1ni 
pi/stij a)lhqh&j.  
5
 DK 2 advances the lesson promised to be learnt from DK 1. 28b-29—how learning “persuasive truth” requires 
positing Being instead of not-being.  DK 3 provides the epistemic test that will serve as the background premise to 
the arguments in DK 8—that there is a strong relationship between thinking and being.  DK 4 is more controversial 
in its assignment to Truth.  DK 4 shares some common imagery and language with DK 1. 31-32 (Cf. the “panto\v 
panta” of DK 1 with the “pa/nth| pa/ntwv” of DK 4). Thus, if the latter were moved to Opinion (Kurfess’ 
suggestion), then perhaps DK 4 should also be.  However, this seems extremely unlikely, given the emphasis on 
investigation via reason in this fragment.  DK 5 is far more “moveable” in terms of position than the others seem to 
be.  For instance, Coxon (reasonably) moves DK 5 to immediately follow DK 1, based upon the implication that the 
line is introductory in nature:  “It is indifferent to me whence I begin, for to that place I shall come back again.” A. 
H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides.  Richard McKirahan, ed.  Revised and Expanded Edition (Las Vegas:  
Parmenides Publishing, 2009). Coxon’s translation.  DK 6 involves a significant controversy about the number of 
“ways of inquiry” present in Parmenides’ poem, and contains one of the most negative passages about mortals 
and their ways of understanding, which could be understood as a part of a negative, transitional introduction to 
Opinion. If any fragment traditionally placed in Truth is a candidate to be moved to Opinion based purely on 
content, DK 6 would be the primary suspect, with DK 4 and DK 5 following, in order of likelihood.  However, 
Simplicius’ explicit testimony that DK 6.8-9a precedes DK 7.2 and DK 8.1-14 makes this highly unlikely. (comm. A’s 
phys. 78.1-10) This is the major tension underlying most arguments for rearrangement—one either trusts 
Simplicius’ explicit testimony, or one does not.  If the former, the orthodox arrangement is hard to challenge; if 
6 
at length by Simplicius, attempting to preserve what he saw as the most important 
philosophical aspects of the poem—a work Simplicius noted to already be rare in his time.  Due 
to their novel philosophical content, and relative completeness, these lines have received far 
more attention than the rest of the extant poem.  For this essay, the important upshots from 
this section are twofold.  First, “that which can be conceived of” is the primary guidepost for 
what exists, and “that which cannot be conceived” (i.e. not-being), does not exist. Secondly, the 
goddess uses this epistemic-ontological relationship to lay out arguments against motion, 
change, generation, perishing, etc.—all of which imply thinking of non-being, and thus cannot 
exist, as it is inconceivable.  In the end, what is true about reality is that Being (whatever its 
numerical extension) is necessarily eternal, unchanging, indivisible and unified.6   
 At DK 8.50-52, the goddess explicitly ends her “trustworthy account and thought about 
truth/reality,”7 and from here on commands the youth, “hearing the deceptive arrangement of 
her words,” to learn mortal opinions.8  Since DK.8 itself contains the fundamental arguments of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not, many possibilities are opened, but little guidance/evidence remains, and charges of arbitrary placement 
increases greatly.   
 
6
 I leave aside here whether all reality is truly one such “being,” or whether Parmenides’ view was open to the 
existence of a plurality of such beings, as commentators like Curd advocate—though I admit I am skeptical of such 
interpretative moves historically.  Even if we are willing to grant that Parmenides argument might be ultimately 
consistent with a plurality of Parmenidian-beings upon further reflection, this is not sufficient to demonstrate that 
this is what Parmenides himself was thinking his argument led to or concluded with, and this is not how Plato or 
Aristotle understood Parmenides.  Furthermore, to claim that the Pluralists and Atomists might have been 
“begging the question” by not providing an explicit argument against strict monism—but instead simply moving on 
and developing a metaphysics consistent with a plurality of Parmenidean-beings—seems to be an anachronistic 
invocation of logical argumentation norms.  To implicitly acknowledge the difficulties that had been raised before, 
and construct an account that avoids those difficulties, while also making sense of the multiplicity perceived in the 
world, would surely have served as a sufficient countervailing response, without the need for direct, explicit 
revocation.  People could simply examine the two perspectives and judge which was more satisfactory by which 
one explained the world better.  Patricia Curd.  The Legacy of Parmenides:  Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic 
Thought (New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1998).  In any case, I leave the question open here. 
7
 e0n tw~i soi pau&w pisto_n lo&gon h)de\ no&hma / a)mfi\j a)lhqei/hj. 
8
 do&caj d' a)po_ tou~de brotei/aj / ma&nqane ko&smon e0mw~n e0pe/wn a)pathlo_n a)kou&wn.  
7 
Truth, and also makes the transition from Truth to Opinion, we can be certain that discussion of 
Opinion did succeed Truth, thus following the same linear order promised at DK 1.28-30.   
 Opinion has traditionally been estimated to be far longer than the previous two sections 
combined.  This is due to its fragmentary nature (only 44 verses, largely disjointed or 
incomplete, are attested), upon apparently quite disparate topics, suggesting a great deal of 
exposition would be needed to properly flesh-out and unify the accounts hinted at.9  Whatever 
its original length, the incompleteness of this section grants little confidence regarding the 
relative arrangement of the fragments, and the apparent disparity in content shrouds their 
relationship to each other, beyond being “descriptions of things in the world.”  
 As DK 8 comes to an end, mortals are explicitly said to err by distinguishing between (or 
“naming”) opposites—Fire (or more commonly in the fragments, “Light,” used interchangeably) 
and Night—by granting each different names and properties, when in fact there is truly only 
one thing (or name), that exists—presumably, Being itself.  To name opposites is to suggest that 
one thing is lacking in some ways, or is at least “other” in some aspects, to its opposite, and 
thus requires thinking “is-not.”  Positing not-being makes inquiry impossible, and thus conflicts 
with truth/reality (and Truth).10   
 This line of thought was first introduced at DK 8.34-41, where the goddess explicitly 
states that Being is all there is, and everything else that mortals take to be real—that there is 
generation and perishing, or change in any way, all of which require positing “is-not,”—is a 
                                                          
9
 Diels estimated that we have 9/10 of Truth, and perhaps 1/10 of Opinion, suggesting the complete poem would 
have spanned 800-1000 lines.  This may certainly be questioned, and will be below. 
10
 For an extensive discussion of the Light-Night dichotomy, see:  Rose Cherubin, “Light, Night, and the Opinions of 
Mortals:  Parmenides B8. 51-61 and B9” Ancient Philosophy 25.1 (2005) 1-23. 
8 
mistake, nothing more than a name.11  This error of mortals is also explicitly addressed in DK. 9.  
In this passage, both light and night, along with their properties (or “powers”), have been given 
names; as a result of this universal naming of opposites, now “all is full of light and invisible 
night together, both being alike, since amongst neither is nothing (or “not being”).”12  The only 
other fragment that undeniably carries on this discussion of “error-by-naming-opposites” is DK. 
19.  Here it is claimed that—only according to (presumably mistaken) belief—things which were 
named in certain ways came-to-be in the past, currently exist, and will ultimately perish.13  This 
fragment has generally taken to be the conclusion for Opinion (if not the entire poem). 
 When these fragments are considered alone, the entire thrust of Opinion clearly seems 
to be negative and didactic.  The “opinions of mortals” are presented solely to illustrate how 
mortals err by naming opposites, accepting there are distinct things in the world, which leads 
them to stray from accepting the conclusions of Truth—that all is unified as Being.  All 
references to generation, perishing, and change in these passages are clearly made out to be 
mere beliefs that mortals hold, and incorrect ones at that.  Thus, there is no difficulty in 
accepting these passages alongside the arguments of Truth.  Nor is there any reason to think 
Opinion stretches on at great length, when only these fragments are considered:  DK 8.50-61 
(even if DK 8.34-41 are included), DK 9, and DK 19 form a relatively succinct and pointed 
argument, for which little additional exposition seems necessary. 
                                                          
11
 It has been recently argued by Ebert (and supported by Palmer) that these lines actually belong at the end of DK 
8, as part of the transition to mortal opinions.  I will discuss this possibility further below.  T. Ebert ‘Wo beginnt der 
Weg der Doxa?  Eine Textumstellung im Fragment 8 des Parmenides,’ Phronesis 34 (1989). 121-38.  John Palmer, 
Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009) 352-4. 
12
 pa~n ple/on e0sti\n o(mou~ fa&eoj kai\ nukto_j a)fa&ntou / i1swn a)mfote/rwn, e0pei\ ou)dete/rwi me/ta mhde/n.  Coxon’s 
translation. 
13
  ou3tw toi kata_ do&can e1fu ta&de kai/ nun e1asi / kai\ mete/peit' a)po_ tou~de teleuth&sousi trafe/nta: / 
toi=j d' o1nom' a1nqrwpoi kate/qent' e0pi/shmon e9ka&stwi. 
9 
 However, the same consistency with Truth, the same universal negativity of treatment, 
and the same succinctness, cannot be so readily granted to Opinion overall, given the remaining 
fragments traditionally placed in this section—all of which lack a clear association with the 
“naming error” with which we can be certain Opinion is concerned.  There are physical-
cosmological explications promised as forthcoming (the origins of the sun, the moon, the 
aether, the earth and the stars; how the moon gets its light from the sun).14  There are passages 
that address (human?) sexuality and birth.15  There are passages hinting at a full theogony in 
the poem, which might even be the beginning of the cosmogony.16  One passage even appears 
to cross into the philosophy of mind, addressing the close relationship between the mind and 
body.17  In any case, the relationship between these “rogue” fragments, and the Light/Night 
naming error that uncontroversially begins (and likely ends) Opinion, is unclear.  Are these 
passages a continuation of that negative exposition?  Or, are they advancing a positive account, 
in contrast to the light/night naming-error? 
 Those who tend to think Parmenides held an entirely negative view of mortal opinions 
have been led to treat these “rogue” passages as suspect.  Perhaps (some of) these passages do 
not belong in Opinion after all, but should actually be located in Truth, as Cordero has recently 
argued.18  At the very least, it is worth recognizing here that the placement of the fragments in 
the orthodox arrangement is worth further examination.  Negative treatments also tend to 
                                                          
14
 DK 10-12, 14-15 
15
 DK 12, 17?, 18. 
16
 DK 12-13. 
17
 DK 16. 
18 Originally argued in Néstor-Luis Cordero, “The ‘Doxa of Parmenides’ Dismantled,” Ancient Philosophy 30 (2010) 
231-246.  For a revised version of the argument, see “Parmenidean ‘Physics’ is not part of what Parmenides calls 
‘do/ca,’” Parmenides:  Venerable and Awesome.  Proceedings of the International Symposium (Buenos Aires, Oct. 
29th-Nov. 2
nd
, 2007) (Las Vegas:  Parmenides Publishing, 2011) 95-113. 
10 
explain the contents of these passages in relation to the Light/Night naming error—a further 
exposition of how mortals go wrong, advanced for didactic purposes. Accordingly, these 
readers do not see anything positive promised to be learned in Opinion by DK 1.31-32. 
 On the other hand, as we have them, these “rogue” passages do seem to claim that 
generation, perishing, motion, and change actually occur—without the explicit caveat that such 
phenomena are erroneous beliefs of mortals.  Furthermore, it seems that a full fleshing-out of 
this physics-cosmology, if a unified section, would seem to go on at significant length—perhaps 
many times longer than Truth.  It seems strange for Parmenides to have gone on at length 
expositing a completely negative, false account of the world, which had no redeeming qualities.  
Finally, some have trouble accepting that Parmenides could truly have meant to deny all value 
to mortal accounts, and/or deny all reality to the apparent world—and thus madly deny his 
own existence, by entailment!  For these reasons, some commentators are led to accept that 
these “rogue” fragments do offer a more positive, contrasting account about the apparent 
world as we experience it, and hold that DK 1.31-32 tells us to expect just that very thing. 
 Deciding between these broad interpretative views is perhaps the most troubling issue 
contemporary commentators face in their interpretation of Parmenides’ poem overall, and 
turns on more specific questions.  What exactly comprises Opinion? What relationship does 
Opinion bear to the arguments in Truth?  How positive (or negative) an account of Opinion is on 
offer in Parmenides?  Is there evidence here for two parts (or more) of Opinion—a negative 
account centered on the Light/Night naming error, and then a positive physics/cosmogony that 
Parmenides offers as an alternative?  Looking back to DK 1.31-32 for guidance in understanding 
these rogue fragments is natural, for several reasons. 
11 
 First, if these “rogue” fragments do succeed the explicit discussion of the errors of 
mortals (Light/Night dualism), as tradition has it, then perhaps just as lines 28-30 seem to 
provide a linear pedagogical program for the earlier material, so too lines 31-32 may be the key 
to understanding these later passages.  Secondly, these lines seem to parallel the 
positive/negative tensions explicated above.  Given that the goddess has criticized the 
epistemic value of the “opinions of mortals” at DK 1.30 (and arguably continues to do so 
explicitly throughout the rest of the poem), any translation of DK 1.31-32 that is too positive 
about mortal opinions risks contradicting the goddess’ immediately prior dismissal of them.  
However, the concessive a)ll' e1mphj, in addition to the positive adverb doki/mwj (“acceptably”) 
in lines 31-32 certainly seems to suggest some positive thing to be learnt related to mortal 
opinions.  What must be determined then is what positive claim is being made, concerning 
what exactly, and how far it extends.19 
  Thus, much interpretative support may be gained by determining whether the lines in 
DK 1.31-32: a) contain some positive caveat to the clearly negative description of the opinions 
of mortals at DK 1.30 (and seemingly throughout the rest of the poem), or b) are, despite the 
apparently positive implications, somehow consistent with that otherwise negative description.  
It should be noted that this is not a strict “dilemma,” as there are numerous interpretative 
positions to be taken along the positive-negative continuum.  However, before any further 
progress can be made on understanding Opinion and its relationship with Truth, DK 1.31-32 and the 
preceding textual lines will have to be examined closely. 
                                                          
19
 Thanassas summarizes the issue well, from his own perspective:  “The only certainty in these verses seems to be 
the fact that, while the subjective opinions themselves (doxai) lack conviction, their objects, the appearing things 
(dokounta), are granted a certain positivity (“acceptably,” dokimôs) to [sic.].  But how far does this positivity 
extend?”  Panagiotis Thanasas, Parmenides, Cosmos, and Being:  A Philosophical Interpretation (Milwaukee:  
Marquette University Press, 1967) 23 
12 
Examining the Problematic Lines in Context:  DK 1.28b-32 
 Returning to the Proem, recall our unnamed youth, traveling along a cosmic path to 
learn the “mysteries” of metaphysics.  He is borne along in a chariot with blazing wheels, pulled 
by wise horses, and driven by the maiden daughters of the sun, who having unveiled their 
countenances, gain entry through the gates dividing night and day.  The poetic imagery is 
commonly taken to be suggestive of a journey from ignorance (darkness) to knowledge (light).20  
Note that the imagery of light/night is already evident, and we know these passages do not 
belong in Opinion. This makes it difficult to claim that any particular fragment/passage 
necessarily belongs in Opinion on the grounds of such references.21 
 Upon arriving at his cosmic destination, the unnamed goddess sets forth what seems to 
be a general outline of how the rest of the poem will unfold, and what the youth must learn.  
The goddess says:22    
    …xrew_ de/ se pa&nta puqe/sqai   (28b) 
    h)me\n  0Alhqei/hj eu)peiqe/ov a)treme\j h}tor 
    h)de\ brotw~n do&caj, tai=j ou)k e1ni pi/stij a)lhqh&j.  (30) 
   a)ll' e1mphj kai\ tau~ta maqh&seai, w(j ta_ dokou~nta  
   xrh~n doki/mwj ei]nai dia_ panto_j pa&nta per o)/nta (32) 
                                                          
20
 This is largely based upon allegorical interpretations, going back to Sextus.  Some more recent readings suggest 
the journey is towards darkness (the House of Night).  See Palmer for a discussion of these variant interpretations. 
Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 52-53. 
21
 This imagery of Light/Day and Darkness/Night may be problematized by further interpretative considerations.  It 
stands in direct analogy to the Fire/Night mistake that is explicitly referred to as the mistake mortals make.  If the 
section on the “opinions of mortals” in fact deals exclusively with these paired opposites, and this is actually the 
very end of poem, just as this imagery is found at the very beginning, we must further wonder what negative 
implication the goddess’ dismissal of the “opinions of mortals” has on the imagery of the proem.  I think a case 
could be made here that Parmenides, though using their poetic meter, is in part aiming at rejecting the traditional 
authority of the poets (Homer and Hesiod) with this imagery.  As Taran similarly points out, if the apparent world is 
illusory, so must the imagery in the Proem.  This realization also tends to undercut allegorical interpretations of the 
Proem.  However, this is all subject for a separate essay.  230. 
22
 While the first part of the proem is told from Parmenides’ own first-person perspective, upon meeting the 
goddess, the rest of the Proem, and the entirety of the rest of the poem, is related from the goddess’ (and thus a 
divine) perspective.  The general progression of personal voice (1
st
 in the Proem, 2
nd
 in Truth, and 3
rd
 in Opinion) 
may be indicative of relative placement of fragments in reconstructing the poem, and thus could support 
arguments for unorthodox arrangements of the poem’s fragments, as Cordero (2007; 2010) argues. 
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Line 28b is straightforward in terms of translation, with no variances in the Greek 
transmission—“It is necessary for you to learn (or “to hear” or “perceive”) all things.”  
 The next two lines narrow the scope of DK 1.28b’s broad claim, specifying what is to be 
learnt: 23 
29)  h)me\n  a)lhqei/hj (eu)peiqe/oj/eu)kukle/oj) a)treme\j h}tor  
 
–“both the unshakeable heart of persuasive truth,”24 
 
30)  h)de\ brotw~n do&caj, tai=j ou)k e1ni pi/stij a)lhqh&j 
 
–“and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no genuine trustworthiness.” 
 
All commentators agree that there are (at least) two distinct things for the youth to learn 
outlined here, which are in contrast to each other in some significant way.  However, the reader 
is already forced to make some judgments regarding the Greek transmission and translation.25 
 It should first be noted that there is some significant debate about whether to translate 
‘a)lhqei/hj’ as “truth” or “reality.”  Coxon, Mourelatos and Palmer all offer substantial 
discussion on this distinction.  While some prefer to translate “reality,” it is also generally 
accepted that while the object of discussion is “reality,” the sense is also that “truth of thought” 
concerning reality is central to the discussion.  I have chosen to adopt the more traditional 
translation of “truth” here, both making clear: 1) that this line introduces the section 
traditionally referred to as ‘Truth’, and 2) emphasizing the contextual epistemic contrast 
between the upcoming arguments of the goddess and the errors of mortals, which these lines 
                                                          
23
 Why it must be learned remains a further question, which seems explicitly answered by the goddess at the end 
of Frag. 8:  so the reader may not to be led astray by such accounts, true as they may seem.   
24
 The manuscripts vary between ‘eupeiqeoj’ and ‘eu)kukle/oj’.  I address this controversy shortly.   
25
 For the variant readings in the manuscripts for these lines, see Appendices A and B. 
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clearly delineate.  However, the reader should keep in mind that the scope of truth for 
Parmenides explicitly concerns the necessary conditions for reality, or Being.26  Thus, translating 
“truth” here should not be taken to imply that “reality” might not be a more appropriate 
translation at other points in the poem.  I will often use “truth/reality” to indicate this 
ambiguity in translation.   
 Though I have read ‘eu)peiqe/oj’ and have translated it as “persuasive” here, there is 
persistent disagreement on which modifier of a)lhqei/hj is correct (eu)peiqe/oj/eu)kukle/oj).27  
eu)kukle/ov (well-rounded; well-wheeled) has attracted readers for several reasons.  First, it 
could be looking back to the imagery of the wheels on P.'s chariot (dinwtoi~sin ku/kloiv--
"whirling” or “bronzed” wheels).  Yet how this allusion to the chariot would be informative or 
meaningful is mysterious.  More importantly, this epithet could also point forward to the 
metaphysical and cosmological description of reality found later in the poem (DK 8.43-44):  
"Being is…like a well-rounded ball.”28  However, as Coxon points out, asserting reality to 
actually be eu)kukle/ov goes well beyond the metaphorical assertion in DK 8—"like a spherical 
                                                          
26
 Coxon 282-283. Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides.  Revised and Expanded Edition (Las Vegas:  
Parmenides Publishing, 2008) 63-67, 156-7. Palmer 89-93. 
27
 The arguments that follow here and below for choosing one reading of the Greek over another assume the 
reconstruction of the poem by DK, which implicitly assumes there is only one occurrence of such lines in the entire 
poem.  However, Kurfess’ “repetition argument” is also worthy of noting here.  Since he thinks the lines given by 
Simplicius are not in fact the final lines of the Proem but from later in the poem, his view does not require choosing 
between these modifiers.  On his view, Sextus’ ‘eupeiqeoj’ is correct for the proemium before Truth, and 
‘eu)kukle/oj’ is a fitting adjective for a proemium transitioning into Opinion.  See Kurfess 24-27.  There is also a third 
modifier attested for a)lhqei/hj here—‘eu)fegge/ov’ (“brilliant”)—which only appears in Proclus’s writings.    While 
this may indeed be a fitting metaphorical description of truth/reality—both picking up on the imagery from the 
proem and possibly pointing forward, identifying truth/reality (a)lhqh&j) with Light in Opinion—its lack of 
attestation, and likely Neo-Platonic influence, have resulted in a (nearly) universal rejection of this reading.  See 
Taran 16-17, and Tarrant 75 for the charge of Neo-Platonism in this case.  See Appendix A for a summary of 
commentators who read each modifier. 
28
 “e)sti…eu)ku&klou sfai/rhj e0nali/gkion o1gkwi” 
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ball…”29  Finally, Simplicius is the only ancient source for the eu)kukle/ov reading.  All other 
ancient commentators read eu)peiqe/ov, including Sextus, upon whose authority nearly the 
entire Proem is based (DK 1.1-30).  Thus, eu)peiqe/sv is better attested.30   
 Not only do the arguments for eu)kukle/ov fail to be convincing, further contextual 
considerations lead to a clear preference for eu)peiqe/ov (“persuasive”).  Consider how the noun 
a)lhqei/hj in Line 29 is repeated in adjectival form a)lhqh&j in line 30, modifying the noun 
pi/stij.  Similarly, we should expect the associated adjective in line 29 (eu)peiqe/oj/eu)kukle/oj) 
to be closely related in meaning to the modified noun in line 30 (pi/stij).  While pi/stij (which 
is uncontested in the manuscripts) is usually translated as “trust,” or “faith” (or the parallel 
states of being such—“faithfulness” or “trustworthiness”) it will certainly later on (if it did not 
already!) take on the meaning “to have persuasive force,” or something that “passes the test,” 
such as a proof in argumentation.31  Furthermore, since “pi/stij a)lhqh&j” can be translated as 
“true trust,” the contrast seems to clearly be truth v. falsity, rather than “real v. unreal.”32 Thus, 
eu)peiqe/oj provides the closely related epistemic contrast—the sense of being “persuasive,” as 
truth should be—which these lines demand, in a way that eu)kukle/oj simply cannot.   
Furthermore, a0lh/qeia is unequivocally associated with the peiq— later, in DK 2.4.  Here, the 
“path of persuasion” (peiqou~v e\sti ke/leuqov) is such (persuasive) precisely because it “attends 
                                                          
29
 Coxon 283-4.  Mourelatos, following Diels, rejects this line of argumentation as sufficient.  154-55. However, 
neither he nor I completely rely upon it alone for our rejection of eu)kukle/ov, nor is this consideration necessary. 
30
 See Mourelatos, 2008 154-57 for further discussion on these points. 
31
 Taran also translates pi/stij along these lines.  210, fn. 19. 
32
 The fact that ‘a)lhqh&j’ must have the epistemic sense of “truth” in this line also recommends translating 
‘a)lhqei/hj’ in a similar fashion in the line above, as opposed to “reality.” 
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upon,” or “accompanies,” truth/reality.33  For all of these reasons, eu)peiqe/ov is clearly the 
preferable reading. 
  Finally, I follow Palmer’s translation “genuine trustworthiness” of “pi/stij a)lhqh&j” 
here.  I worry that other translations such as “true conviction,” “true trust,” “genuine 
acceptance,” etc., can suggest the unintentionally unfortunate (and nonsensical) reading that 
no one actually believes in or trusts in the “opinions of mortals.”34 
 With these considerations in mind, the translation of the contextual lines DK 1.28b-30 is 
adequately captured as: 
“…It is necessary for you to learn all things: 
both the unshakeable heart of persuasive truth 
and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no genuine trustworthiness.” (30) 
 
Leaving the lines lying at the heart of this inquiry to be dealt with: 
 
  a)ll' e1mphj kai\ tau~ta maqh&seai, w(j ta_ dokou~nta  
   xrh~n doki/mwj ei]nai dia_ panto_j pa&nta per o)/nta [perw~nta]  (32) 
 
Prior to progressing further, it may be helpful to briefly outline the numerous textual difficulties 
and possibilities that are faced here.  
 The most immediate question to be addressed is: “what is the referent of tau~ta?”  
Grammatically, the first (unbolded) clause “a)ll' e1mphj kai\ tau~ta maqh&seai,” is ambiguous.  
The almost certainly concessive “a)ll' e1mphj” suggests an upcoming, positive clause that will 
be surprising, considering what has come before.  The sense is surely “nevertheless (despite 
mortal opinions being untrustworthy), you will also learn these things…”  This is the primary 
interpretative tension in these lines—what positive recommendation (in what sense, to what 
                                                          
33
 For further discussion on these points, see:  Coxon 283-4; Mourelatos 154-58 
34
 Palmer appears to share this worry. 92 
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extent, etc.), which is at least related to, if not identical to, mortal opinions—is upcoming?  This 
concessive construction has led many to most naturally suggest that tau~ta points backwards 
to the previous line (30), referring to and qualifying the “beliefs of mortals” (brotw~n do&caj).35  
 However, even accepting ‘a)ll' e1mphj’ as concessive also allows tau~ta to point 
forwards, referring to the clause after the comma, introducing a third thing—something related 
to the “opinions of mortals,” but distinct—that will be surprising to learn (despite the fallibility 
of mortal opinions).  Nothing in the syntax itself requires either reading.  Thus, readers 
ultimately have to choose between one of the following formats regarding the referent of 
tau~ta: 
 1)  “Nevertheless (though mortal opinions possess no genuine trustworthiness), you will 
also learn how these things (the opinions of mortals)…” 
 2)  “Nevertheless (though mortal opinions possess no genuine trustworthiness), you will 
also learn about these [related but distinct] other things (about to be mentioned)…” 
 
While both readings must have some unexpected, positive contrast to the fallibility of mortal 
opinions, the kind of positive recommendation, and the degree, will be found to vary 
significantly between these readings, when further examined below.36   
 The second clause (in bold, after the comma) presents both semantic and grammatical 
difficulties, which greatly depend upon: the relationship between the dok- words; what sense 
of xrh/n we adopt (strict necessity, past obligation, or counterfactual (irrealis); and the 
syntactical arrangment.  As there are numerous interpretative and grammatical possibilities for 
nearly every word, and since the context is so uncertain, it is impossible to select among many 
                                                          
35
 For some arguments along these lines (outside of Mourelatos’, which will be considered below), see:  Nestor-
Luis Cordero, By Being, It Is (Las Vegas:  Parmenides Publishing, 2004). Richard D. McKirahan, Philosophy Before 
Socrates:  An Introduction with Texts and Commentary.  2
nd
 Edition (Indianapolis:  Hackett, 2010) and G. E. L. Owen, 
“Eleatic Questions” The Classical Quarterly, New Series 10.1 (May, 1960) 84-102, and Palmer—all of who take 
these passages to refer to the contents of mortal opinions.   
36
 See Appendices C & D for an overview on this. 
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of them without considering external evidence from the rest of the poem, which always risks 
question-begging circularity in favor of one’s preconceived interpretation of the poem. 
 For instance, ‘w(j’  could conceivably function as a relative pronoun (“as” or “how”), a 
conjunction (“nevertheless”), introduce a simile (“just as,” “like”), begin a result clause, or as 
qualifying or  strengthening  (“truly,” ) the adverb  (‘doki/mwj’) 
  ‘ta dokou~nta’ (doke/w) is clearly a  substantive participle (pres. act. n. pl. nom/acc).  
However, what ‘ta\ dokou~nta’ means is a subject of much controversy, related directly to the 
previously mentioned problem of the ambiguous tau~ta.  The most common translations are 
“things that are accepted,” or “appearances.”  The etymologically related adverb ‘doki/mwj’ 
allows many variant translations (“apparently,” “imaginably,” “believably,” “acceptably”), and 
some have even argued it should actually be read as a verb.37   
 ‘xrh~n’  is clearly an epic form of the verb xrh/  (3rd sg. Imperf. Indic. act.).  However, its 
use here is difficult to grasp, and whether it is to be understood as a simple past-obligation or a 
counterfactual usage is hotly debated.  Even limiting interpretative views to those that accept 
the counterfactual reading (as most modern readers do) yields numerous variant views.  By 
position and context, ‘xrh~n’ will almost certainly have to be closely associated  with ‘ei]nai,’ 
which while certainly an infinitive of ei)mi/ (pres act ind), we are left to determine the syntactical 
relationship—such as whether ‘ei]nai’ should be read as a copulative (of predication or 
identity?) or an existential absolute. 
                                                          
37
 Diels famously emended doki/mwj to doki/mws(ai), the aorist infinitive of doki/mwmi, with the sense of “to be 
tested”. 
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 The prepositional phrase ‘dia_ panto_j’ certainly goes together, meaning “throughout 
the whole,” “entirely,” or “altogether.”38  ‘pa&nta,’ could be adverbial (“in every way,” “on 
every side,” or “altogether”) and can be taken as directly modifying this prepositional phrase 
(which functions adjectivally for the overall participial phrase), or the participle itself at the end 
of line 32.  However, this neuter-plural form of pa~v is also commonly used as the substantive 
adjective for “all things.” 
 Not only is the text obscure, it is clearly corrupted, leaving us with a choice between two 
neuter-plural, present participles: 1) perw~nta, from ‘pera/w,’ (“to pass through”) and 2) 
‘o)/nta,’ (modified by the particle ‘per’), from ei)mi/ (“is/exists”).  The determination between 
these two readings results in radically different interpretative outcomes, with the ta_ dokou~nta 
being described respectively as “passing through” or “just being, in some unified or complete 
manner (dia_ panto_j pa&nta). 
 Finally, if one reads ‘o)/nta,’ the particle ‘per’ must also be accounted for.  The exact 
force this particle possessed in epic poetry is hard to discern, as Denniston and other 
commentators admit, and the various grammatical distinctions are not easily separable.39  In 
participial phrases, ‘per’ is most commonly concessive.  However, we are already in a 
concessive clause due to the ‘a)ll' e1mphj,’so this sense simply will not work.40  The other 
common senses of ‘per’ in epic poetry are hard to distinguish, and generally emphasize 
(“intensive” sense) and/or focus on one thing (“determinative” or “limitative” senses), often at 
the exclusion of other considerations.  These senses can be variably captured in translation by: 
                                                          
38
 The preposition ‘dia\’ (“through”) can take either genitive or accusative (with the same meaning) in poetry.  
Here, it clearly takes the expected genitive singular ‘panto_j’ (in the singular—“the whole” or “the entirety”). 
39
 For the uses of ‘per’, see J.D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1934). 481-490. 
40
 As Mourelatos notes, a concessive ‘per’ wrecks any attempt at translation.  214, fn. 59. 
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“indeed,” “completely,” “just,” or “truly”.  In the next section, I begin eliminating these 
interpretative possibilities. 
What does DK 1.31-32 Say? 
 As it seems prudent to settle on the most likely Greek text before beginning any fine-
grained translation, I begin at the end, with the variant participial endings—“perw~nta” versus 
“per o)/nta.”  Simplicius is our sole source for lines 31-32, and out of four manuscripts attesting 
these lines, ‘per o)/nta’ is favored over ‘perw~nta’ 3-to-1, and always in earlier or contemporary 
manuscripts.  Thus, ‘per o)/nta’ is clearly better attested.  While this alone would be sufficient 
to justify reading ‘per o)/nta,’ there are further considerations that make reading ‘perw~nta’ 
problematic.   
 As Mourelatos has famously (and correctly) argued, the sense of ‘perw~nta’ (from 
pera/w) is to “pass through and leave behind.”  It does not mean “to pass into and remain 
present,” as the translation “pervade” implies.  While the latter could be an attractive 
interpretation—explaining how ta_ dokou~nta are pervasive throughout the world (dia_ panto_j 
pa&nta), much like Fire/Night are said to be in DK. 8—once the semantics of the verb are 
correctly understood, the reading is no longer attractive, or even sensible.  After all, “the last 
thing we expect from the goddess is a revelation that the dokou~nta of mortals ‘transcend all 
things.’” 41   
 Furthermore, reading ‘perw~nta’ leaves Being—the primary object of inquiry for the 
poem—entirely unmentioned in the Proem by name.  Reading ‘per o)/nta’ happily provides just 
                                                          
41
 Mourelatos 212-14. Thanassas also agrees that Mourelatos’ arguments should have ended the debate on this. 
24, fn. 2.  For a list of major contemporary commentators and their preference for each reading, see Appendix B. 
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such an introduction, and in a particularly fitting way, though this may not be obvious at first.  
Taking the neuter-plural participle literally (which agrees with ‘ta_ dokou~nta’ and pa&nta), and 
modifying it with the “determinative” ‘per,’ the sense of ‘per o)/nta’ is “things that genuinely 
are,” or “just as beings.”42  However, it should be recognized that the neuter-plural participle 
does not require us to also translate the participial action itself in the plural.  Instead, this can 
be translated:  “just as things being,” or “things genuinely being.”43  With this understanding, it 
is clear that reading ‘per o)/nta’ at this terminal position places all the emphasis of the Proem 
on exactly what we would expect it to—Being, qua being, at the exclusion of extraneous 
considerations.44  Furthermore, this ending appropriately transitions into what is to be 
discussed immediately afterwards—the arguments in Truth on the necessary conditions for 
Being.45   
 Again, while advocates of the ‘perw~nta’ reading have argued for similar contextual 
recommendations, these arguments are only possible/tenable under the mistaken 
understanding of ‘perw~nta’ as “pervade”.46  As long as Mourelatos’ argument against this 
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 The particle ‘per’ is probably best understood in either the determinative sense, which is closely related to and 
implicitly includes the “intensive” sense, to the exclusion of other considerations.  Denniston 482-483.  Mourelatos 
also advocates this understanding.  214, fn. 61.  Owen, on the other hand, argues specifically for the intensive use. 
43
 The singular use here should not be controversial.  As Mourelatos himself points out, Parmenides seems to 
remain as neutral as possible regarding the ontological number of Being prior to the arguments of DK. 8, using the 
both singular and plural indiscriminately to refer to Being in DK. 4   Numerous others have also adopted singular 
translations here (e.g. Coxon, Curd, Owens).  Only Thanassas emphasizes the plural form, translating “beings.”  As I 
ultimately leave open the number of beings Parmenides argues for, I am not strongly committed to either singular 
or plural translations in this essay. 
44
 Mourelatos insightfully compares this use of ‘per’ to the later philosophical ‘h(~’. 214-15. 
45
 Thanassas (2007, 26) also comments on the significance of this word’s placement.  Mitchell Miller also finds the 
inclusion of the “is” in the Proem good reason to preference this reading. “Ambiguity and Transport,” Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 30 (2006):  1-47.  13 
46
 For instance, Palmer argues that this line, meaning “had actually to be, all through all pervading,” ties in well 
with the DK. 9.3-4, where it is said “all is full of light and invisible night together.”  However, Palmer seems to 
entirely ignore Mourelato’s argument against this reading.  Ignoring Mourelatos on this point when reading 
‘perw~nta’ is not uncommon, and the oversight can be even more glaring—at least Palmer offers some 
argumentation for the reading.  On the other hand, Coxon, whose scholarship is perhaps second-to-none but 
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meaning stands—that ‘perw~nta’ means “to pass through and leave behind,” or “transcend,” 
not “persistently permeate”—there are simply no grounds to defend the ‘perw~nta’ reading, 
and all should adopt the ‘per o)/nta’ spelling instead.  Given this, I ignore all interpretations 
reliant upon the ‘perw~nta’ reading from here on.47   
 Taking a broader view of the participial phrase, the prepositional clause ‘dia_ panto_j’ 
clearly has the sense of “through(out) all things.” Taking the singular form literally can also yield 
translations along the lines of:  “as a whole,” “completely,” or even “altogether”.  As noted 
above, ‘pa&nta’ has several possible grammatical and syntactical possibilities, with the more 
common substantive-adjective use (“all things”) being most likely here, as a subject replacing 
‘ta_ dokou~nta.’  However, the syntax for the overall participial phrase remains unclear.   
 If ‘per o)/nta’ is taken as a copulative, we could read: a) “all things just being altogether” 
(pa&nta as substantive subject; unity of all things dokou~nta predicated), or b) “just being all 
things altogether” (pa&nta as substantive object; dokou~nta are suggested to be all there is).48  
However, as argued above, ‘per o)/nta’ can also be taken in the more substantive, absolutive 
sense (with no predicate), emphasizing its ontological sense.  This can be understood in these 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Mourelatos on Parmenides, passes over his selection of ‘perw~nta’ over ‘per o)/nta’ without a single word on 
controversial selection in his otherwise excellent commentary on the text.   
47
 Mourelatos also points out that the metaphorical sense of “pervade” in relation to mortal opinions is unattested 
elsewhere in the Greek corpus, which if correct, would be surprising given its apparent appeal.  For his arguments 
on this, see 212-213, which I omit from the arguments in my text, as they are not as clearly convincing as 
Mourelatos seems to think they are. Thanassas also provides a further challenge to the ‘perw~nta’ reading, 
pointing out that if ta\ dokou~nta (“appearing things”) are supposed to “pervade everything,” what could possibly 
be the “everything” that is distinct from, yet “pervaded by,” these ta\ dokou~nta?  Clearly, they could not be 
anything discovered by the senses.   I leave this out of the text as well, as there are obvious objections to this line 
of argumentation as it stands (e.g. Palmer’s limitation on the scope of ta\ dokou~nta to the only the Light/Night 
dualism easily avoids this worry).  However, Thanassas’ point can be helpful if further assumptions are made clear, 
and I come back to this below in my discussion of the referent of tau~ta. Cf. my fn. 48, for more on Palmer’s view. 
48
 Mourelatos reads the copulative sense here:  “just being all of them altogether.” 216. 
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translations: “as being(s), indeed, all things altogether,” “all things just being, altogether/as 
one,” or perhaps more clearly, “all things, altogether, just as being(s).”49   
 While no certainty between these syntactical constructions can be had, I think this 
participial phrase is clearly suggestive of offering insight into the relationship between the 
Opinion and Truth.  Not only is there a clear ontological emphasis on any arrangement, the 
sense of an existential unity being predicated in relation to ta\ dokou~nta can hardly be denied.  
Indeed, the phrasing ‘panto_v pa/nta’ is mirrored only in one fragment, clearly belonging to 
Truth.50  Thus, as reading ‘per o)/nta’ invokes the arguments in Truth, I prefer the latter 
ontological and absolutive sense for the entire participial phrase—“all things, altogether, just as 
being(s)”.  This reading best captures the exclusionary emphasis on Being required by ‘per’, and 
thus best makes the transition to Truth, while invoking the unity of Being in DK. 8.51 
 To move any further in this analysis, it is necessary to analyze the meaning of the dok- 
words, which the careful reader cannot help but notice appear repeatedly in each line (DK 1.30-
32)—a repetition that suggests a strong relationship is intended between these lines.52  
However, while certainly closely related, we should also expect some fine-grained distinctions 
in each of their respective iterations (noun, participle, adverb).  It has been widely held that for 
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 This is essentially Thanassas’ interpretation of the participial phrase.  He describes this grammatical reading of 
the participle o)/nta “not as a copula but in an ‘absolutive’ syntactic construction…to attribute to it the entire 
ontological weight of the verb “to be” that we encounter in other parts of Parmenides’ poem:  ‘all that appears 
is.’”  24.    
50
 Cf. DK. 4 “pa/nth| pa/ntwv’, which explicitly speaks to the unity of Being.  Also, the arguments in DK. 8 for a 
unified Being, “like a sphere,” are certainly suggested by this description of “all things, altogether, being.” 
51
 I again leave being(s) numerically ambiguous, as I am ambivalent either way.  One can go ahead and make it 
singular, in anticipation of Truth, and I think the reader is supposed to recognize this in retrospect.  Or, one can 
leave it plural, waiting for the arguments in Truth to make the move to discussing Being as a unified, singular thing, 
but recognizing here that the reader is supposed to understand that they will learn about ta\ dokou~nta in terms of 
Being. 
52 h)de\ brotw~n do&caj, tai=j ou)k e1ni pi/stij a)lhqh&j 
a)ll' e1mphj kai\ tau~ta maqh&seai, w(j ta_ dokou~nta 
xrh~n doki/mwj ei]nai dia_ panto_j pa&nta perw~nta [or per o)/nta] 
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epic in general (and Parmenides in particular), dok— words (from doke/w) have the sense of 
“active cognitive acceptance,” in that they have been “reliably tested,” and are thereafter 
found “acceptable” to our minds.53  In short, the general sense is “acceptable upon 
examination,” whether ultimately true or false.  This basic etymological sense is universally 
accepted. 
 On the understanding of dok- words as “acceptable,” the following determinations can 
be made.  First, “brotw~n do&caj” are thus not to be confused with any mere beliefs, easily 
dismissed.  Instead, they are views that mortals have accepted and endorsed for what at least 
appeared to be good reasons, or upon significant grounds—even though they are false, in this 
case.  Second, the adverb ‘doki/mwj’ has the sense of something tested so as to be “reliable,” or 
“trustworthy”; or rather, to make explicit the adverbial nature—“acceptably.”54  Finally, but far 
more controversially, the substantive participle (‘ta\ dokou~nta’) should thus be translated as 
“the things deemed acceptable [to be the case, by mortals],” or the “things that seem [to be 
the case, to mortals].”  However, what exactly the “things deemed acceptable” refers to 
remains controversial.  I return to this below, and its relationship to the referent of tau~ta, 
after consideration of xrh/n. 
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 Cordero 31, Coxon 285, Curd (1998) 22, Mourelatos 195-205, Owen 86, Palmer 176-8, Taran 212-13. 
54
 This assumes, of course, that ‘doki/mwj’ is in fact an adverb, contrary to Diels’ proposed reading.  dokimo/w is 
listed in LSJ as an o-contract verb, supposedly identical to dokima/zw, and Parmenides’ line 1.32 is explicitly listed 
as one of three possible sources for this otherwise rare form.  What exactly this listing relies on, I do not know.  
Diels’ own emendation of these lines, reading the verbal form dokimo/w~s(ai) as doki/mwmi is another verbal 
possibility.  However, Diels’ emendation has been so regularly refuted on numerous grounds (unnecessary; 
requires an unacceptable sense of xrh~n; impossible elision of (-ai) in hexameter poetry—only found in two 
instances of Comedy; form is rare if not otherwise nonexistent in epic poetry) that it is either completely ignored, 
or quickly dismissed with a mere footnote (most commonly citing Reinhardt’s objections.  6-10.  Also, see Taran 
212, fn. 22, and W.R. Chalmers “Parmenides and the Beliefs of Mortals,” Phronesis 5.1 (1960):  5-22; 6-7, for an 
excellent summary of the criticism of Diels’ verbal emendation.   
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 Much like selecting ‘per o)/nta’ over ‘perw~nta,’ determining the correct sense of xrh~n 
will also reduce the number of interpretative possibilities up for consideration.  As noted above, 
xrh~n is clearly an imperfect form of xrh/.  Imperfect forms of this verb generally carry the sense 
of either: a a) counterfactual, or b) a past obligation.  Mourelatos argues extensively for the 
counterfactual reading, pointing out first that in Archaic Greek, xrh/ did not have the sense of 
“necessity” we find in later texts, but the sense “it is fitting” or “it is right/proper”.55  This, in 
conjunction with taking doki/mwv to mean “acceptably” leads him to charge the past obligation 
reading as paying “too strong a compliment to mortal docai”—a problem that we must indeed 
be careful to avoid, as noted above, and which many modern translations suffer from.  For if ta\ 
dokou~nta is at all related to mistakes of mortals (which it clearly seems to be, whether tau~ta 
points backwards or forwards), we don’t want to end up having line 31 irrevocably contradict 
the negative description of mortal opinions in line 30.  Why this is problematic can perhaps 
most readily be seen by comparing the sample translation Mourelatos provides for xrh/n as a 
past obligation, to his final translation with the counterfactual: 
 (Past Obligation):  “you shall learn…how it was fatefully right for the things found 
acceptable to be [or “to exist”] acceptably.”56 
 
 (Counterfactual):  “you shall learn…how it would be right for things deemed acceptable 
to be acceptably.” 
 
Under a past obligation translation, we seem committed to saying there has been something 
right going on with what mortals have believed/endorsed all along—that they are fine just as 
they are.  In light of the completely negative description of the opinions of mortals in the 
                                                          
55
 Mourelatos (2008) 207.   
56
 Mourelatos (2008) 207.  I have modified the translation here to read “acceptably,” to best mirror the 
counterfactual example, though Mourelatos actually uses “with full endorsement” to capture the meaning of 
doki/mwv.  I take this is only a matter of stylistic change, as “acceptable to be acceptably” is awkward. 
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immediately preceding line, such translations yield a “glaring contradiction” to the goddess’ 
denial of the trustworthiness in the opinions of mortals, as they cannot simultaneously be 
lacking in all fidelity, yet it be “fatefully right” to hold these views, now, or in the past, as they 
are.57 
 The second translation, then, is far more consistent with something being wrong with 
what mortals have accepted, and admitting that their errors persist.  The positive spin from 
doki/mwv is not that the “things deemed acceptable” are actually acceptable (or have been in 
the past), but that the youth will be shown some sort of alternative account of these things that 
would be acceptable.  What exactly that positive alternative is has yet to be determined.  It 
could be, as many have thought, Parmenides’ own, personally endorsed cosmology.  Or (as I 
argue below), it could mean that the opinions of mortals should be understood in terms of 
Truth.  Either way, Mourelatos certainly seems correct:  the counterfactual interpretation is 
required due to the positive sense of doki/mwv; and the burden of proof lies on those who 
would challenge that sense of xrh~ here.58  Accordingly, I dismiss all interpretative views reliant 
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 For a very recent example of a translation that makes this mistake, see Palmer:  “how what they resolved had 
actually to be, all through all pervading.”  363.  It takes a lot of further explanation that is not obvious in the 
translation to avoid this unfortunate implication, and thus suggests a poor translation is on hand, as the next note 
makes more clear. 
58
 Mourelatos (2008) 207.  For the opposite conclusion on the sense of xrh~n, in addition to understanding 
doki/mwv as “acceptable,” See Taran 205-216.  To find the heart of Mourelatos’ criticism of Taran, pay attention to 
how the past obligation sense of xrh~n, which entails necessity and correctness, has had to be softened over the 
exposition to mean “how [the accepted things] came to be accepted” (216).  The point is that even those who have 
defended the past obligation reading have had to actually back away from its strict requirement of necessity to 
maintain a coherent interpretative view of the lines, which requires not saying anything too positive of the 
accepted things.  Similarly, Owen (1960) admits that the world of appearances cannot be said to “assuredly exist,” 
but avoids concluding that xrh~n is counterfactual by suggesting the goddess is reporting the views of mortals 
themselves in these lines, second-hand.  See Mourelatos (2008)209, fn. 46 for further criticism of Owen.  Curd 
1998 also accepts xrh~n as a past obligation, while reading per o)/nta.  Coxon also adopts the past necessity sense 
of xrh~n, but reads perw~nta. 
27 
upon the past obligation understanding of xrh~n, and commit to the counterfactual reading, 
which can be variously translated as “ought to have been” or “should/would have been.”59 
 I pause here to take stock of the progress so far.  I will translate e1mphj kai as 
“nevertheless…also,” acknowledging the concessive sense of ‘e1mphj’ (at least as far as “despite 
mortal beliefs being untrustworthy”), again leaving the referent for tau~ta and the exact sense 
of ta\ dokou~nta open for the moment.  Since w(v does not seem to be introducing any special 
sort of subordinate clause, I will take it as most other commentators seem to—a relative adverb 
of manner (“how”).60  Thus, the translation at this point reads:   
 “But nevertheless (despite the lack of genuine trustworthiness of mortal opinions), you 
will also learn these things:  how (ta\ dokou~nta—“the things accepted”) ought to have 
been (doki/mwv—“acceptably”) (ei)~nai—“to be”):  all things, altogether, just as being(s).” 
 
Though the meaning of the words set off in parentheses are clear, I leave them unincorporated 
at this point, as the syntactical relationship between these words remains unclear.61  
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 Unfortunately, even those who recognize the aptness of the counterfactual xrh/n here do not always properly 
understand what is “counter-to-fact” in these lines.  For example, Cordero argues for a particular interpretation 
along these lines that should be resisted.  Translating xrh/n as “might have been necessary,” he claims that while 
ta\ dokou~nta are not in fact real, they are what “might have really existed (that is, they might have occupied the 
place of true, real knowledge) if truth did not exist.”  This means the goddess is promising to teach the youth an 
account of how, despite the opinions of mortals being false under current conditions, they might have been true 
otherwise, had the truth of Being not been the case.  This is immensely confused.  The error seems to be the 
suggestion that if there was no objective truth about Being, then all that would exist would be opinion, and thus, 
opinions would be true—which clearly does not follow.   Cordero himself even admits this position makes no 
sense, given that the truth does exist.  Yet he remains committed to ascribing this view to Parmenides, waving the 
objections of implausibility away by asserting that similar errors have occurred in the history of philosophy, while 
not even providing one parallel example, so we are left to guess at just who is supposed to be making such errors.  
Whatever other deep errors we might find in this description, it should be clear that the force of lines 31-32 is not 
how the world itself might have been otherwise (an ontological claim), and thus how epistemology might have 
been affected; rather, the lines remain clearly within the epistemic realm throughout. The counterfactual is not 
how opinions might have been true, under certain necessary conditions (i.e. the actual world being different); 
instead, it is how mortals should have understood the world (perhaps given the necessary conditions required for 
there to be anything, such as Being), if one wants to emphasize that etymological aspect of xrh/n), but that mortals 
in fact currently (counterfactually) fail to do so.  Cordero (2004).   
60
Mourelatos (2008) 210 is the only modern commentator I am aware of to pay enough attention to w(v to 
comment on its grammatical function. 
61 Here are some possible syntactical constructions that have been favored in the literature, outlined by 
Mourelatos 194, fn 1:  
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Fortunately, given the determinations made above, most of these possibilities have been 
dismissed as “live” options.  To finish off the translation, and determine what DK 1.31-32 
means, further consideration of ‘ta\ dokou~nta,’ and the referent of ‘tau~ta,’ is required.  
However, these further considerations can only be adequately addressed in the context of the 
primary interpretative dilemma. 
The Contemporary Interpretative Dilemma in Lines 31-32: Orthodox Arrangement 
 At this point, the primary interpretative dilemma for the overall poem becomes 
relevant—what is the relationship between Truth and Opinion?  In what sense are the objects 
of mortal opinion, the “things deemed acceptable,” to be acceptably understood in terms of 
Being?  What status, in terms of positive or negative recommendation, does Parmenides 
ultimately grant Opinion?  While there are numerous variant interpretations along the positive-
negative continuum, there seem to be two main approaches that can be generally addressed 
here.  
 First, one could adopt a more negative approach, and understand this as meaning that 
mortals beliefs about the world are completely erroneous.  To understand how the objects in 
the world are properly understood is not to understand them as they appear to mortals—
coming-to-be, changing, perishing, etc.  Rather, proper understanding requires accepting that 
the Being, as argued for in Truth, is all there really is.  This could mean denying the apparent 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1) xrh~n takes ei]nai as subject, ei]nai takes subject (ta_ dokou~nta),  doki/mwj adverbially modifies ei]nai, and “dia_ 
panto_j…” is a participial phrase referring to ta_ dokou~nta.   
2) Same as #1, except ei]nai serving as copula between subject (ta_ dokou~nta), and predicate (perw~nta), with dia_ 
panto_j pa&nta and doki/mwj both linked to the predicate.   
3) Verb xrh~n takes as subject inf. dokimw~sai (read instead of doki/mwj), the latter taking perw~nta as a subject 
(with understood tina/  or se/) ta_ dokou~nta, complemented by ei]nai, is the object of dokimw~sai.  “dia_ 
panto_j…” can be attached to either a) ta_ dokou~nta or b) perw~nta.   
4) Same as #3, except:  ei]nai is complement of dokimw~sai; ta_ dokou~nta is subject of ei]nai.   
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world entirely—it is all an illusion.62  It would also be possible for one to hold that the 
arguments in Truth are consistent with a reality composed of a plurality of beings, but accepting 
that Parmenides does not provide this positive view in his poem.63  In either case, the lesson 
promised in DK 1.31-32 is fulfilled in Truth.  There is no positive account on offer in Opinion, no 
“acceptable” cosmology that Parmenides himself endorsed, etc.  Opinion is offered purely as a 
didactic lesson on how mortals err.64  One final set of somewhat “middling” views I also place 
on the more “negative” side of this dichotomy—those views which take Parmenides to be 
arguing that fundamental reality is as described in Truth, and that the account of the apparent 
world in Opinion is Parmenides’ own best account of the world of human experience, from that 
empirical perspective.  Opinion is still not true—it is just an accurate description of appearances 
based upon empirical senses, a description which is completely false and misleading.65 
 Secondly, on the more positive approach, one can read these lines as promising an 
account of the apparent world of change that is in some way consistent with the arguments in 
Truth, and that this promise is fulfilled later on, in Opinion (particularly by those “rogue” 
fragments discussed above).  The world exists in its plurality, participating in change, but is all in 
some way unified as, dependent upon, and/or perhaps ultimately composed of, changeless 
beings.  It has been common for proponents of more positive readings to translate ‘ta\ 
dokou~nta’ as “appearances.”  Such a translation is also often accompanied by a “Platonic,” 
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 Mourelatos (2008), and Owen are representatives of this negative view.   
63
 Curd originally followed this line of thinking (1991), but later changed her mind for more positive interpretations 
(1992 and 2009) 
64
 Taran and Cordero explicitly support these views of Opinion. 
65
 Coxon, McKirahan, and Nehamas best fit this latter, more “middling” but still rather negative, view.  The 
criterion I am using to place these in the negative camp is the emphasis on Truth being reality, and whatever is 
described in Opinion being false, mistaken, lacking legitimacy, and/or ultimately something which should not be 
accepted.  Alexander Nehamas, “On Parmenides’ Three Ways of Inquiry” Deucalion 33/34 (1981):  97-111. 
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two-world view, in which gradations of reality are posited.66  Truth is thus about how things 
really are at the divine level of reason (much like the Forms), but the apparent world needs to 
be explained as well, and can be done so in a manner appropriate for mortal beings.67  Thus, it 
is claimed, Parmenides is offering in Opinion an “acceptable” account of the world from the 
empirical, human perspective—an account that is somehow consistent with ultimate reality, 
and not completely false and/or illusory.68   
 Different translations and syntactical arrangements tend to support different 
interpretative views.  Examining the implications of variant readings for DK 1.31-32, and what it 
most naturally must mean given the conclusions drawn above, may help in narrowing down the 
interpretative options further, while avoiding question-begging as much as possible. 
What does DK 1.31-32 Mean? 
 It has been taken as most natural by many that ‘tau~ta’ should be understood to point 
backwards, to ‘brotw~n do&caj’.  As noted above, this is due to the concessive nature of “a)ll' 
                                                          
66
 As usual, there are many diverse views relying upon the translation “appearances,” and which to various degrees 
might be charged with adopting this more Platonic view of Parmenides.  Historically, such positive views of Opinion 
dealing with “appearances” or “phenomenon” begin with Aristotle, but are more often related back to the Neo-
Platonist Simplicius.  While few modern commentators want to openly admit that they adopt such an 
anachronistic Platonic explanation, many views are implicitly indebted to this interpretative background.  Even the 
phrases “The Way of Seeming,” or “world of appearances,” which I have at times above fallen into using, is 
indicative of this influence.  On the negative reading, there is no account of the “world of appearances,” or 
separate reality to be discussed beyond the Being of Truth, but an account of how mortals, relying on their senses 
rather than reason, have been misled regarding their understanding of the one and only reality. Palmer’s recent 
proposal comes very close to the “two-world” view of Plato.  He argues that Truth is solely focused on the 
characteristics of necessary being.  This allows for there to also exist things that are accidental (things that are, but 
need not be), and thus the world of change, which is evident to us mortals, can also have a positive account given 
of it.  On his view, the error of mortals is not mistakenly supposing these things exist, but since they are only ever 
exposed to accidental being by their senses, they are mistaken in thinking that these are the only things that do 
exist, failing to recognize immutable Being as a category of existence revealed only by reason. 
67
 This view is advocated by Cherubin and Finkelberg.  A very similar but more fine-grained view, is offered by 
Thanassas.   Aryeh Finkelberg, “Being, Truth and Opinion in Parmenides” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 
81.3 (1999):  233-248. 
68
 J. L. Owens also fits into this more positive mold, and translates “appearances.” 
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e1mphj,” and is further supported by the similar language and context found at the very 
beginning of Opinion, “do/cav brotei/av…ma/nqane.”69  What would ‘ta\ dokou~nta’ have to 
mean, on this reading, with the prior referent for ‘tau~ta’ being “the opinions of mortals”? 
 These “accepted things” certainly cannot be taken to be identical to the “opinions of 
mortals” in themselves.  Such a translation would require us understanding that the mortals’ 
subjective opinions themselves (their very mental states) ought “to acceptably be all 
things…just as being(s)—as if mortal thoughts comprised all the beings in the world.70  Clearly, 
we need some objective “things in the world” as a subject, if they should acceptably be all the 
beings.71  So, by “opinions of mortals,” one should understand that either 1) the contents of 
mortal opinions are being referred to—what is believed to be the case by mortals, or 2) the 
objects of mortal opinions—the things in the world mortals opine about. 
 Understanding ‘ta\ dokou~nta’ as referring to the contents of mortal opinions still 
requires the backwards-pointing tau~ta, and thus there are still just two broad categories of 
things to learn from the goddess (truth and opinion).  One way to understand this is to take the 
entire phrase “w(v… o)/nta” epexegetically, as a report of what mortals themselves believe 
about the world.  The sense is that the reader will learn these very things—what it is that 
mortals mistakenly believe—and the rest of lines 31-32 explicate what exactly those beliefs are:  
“how the things accepted ought to be acceptably…as beings.”  While some editors do read ‘ta\ 
                                                          
69
 I am indebted to Long for bringing this to my attention.  In Line 8.51-52, “mortal opinions” is again object to the 
same verb (manqa/nw) that we find in line 31 (just in the present-tensed imperative mood, rather than the future 
tense). 
70
 No translation of the participial phrase would make sense of this.  How the opinions themselves ought to be: 1) 
all things, being altogether, 2: just being, all things altogether, 3) pervading throughout all things. 
71
 I know of no one who makes this mistake, but it is worth pointing out what is not meant when saying tau~ta 
points backwards to ‘brotw~n do&caj’, to avoid any confusion. 
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dokou~nta’ in just such a way, this does not make any sense on my translation.72  Mortals 
themselves do not think that what they have accepted should be acceptable in terms of 
Being—they don’t even know what Being is yet!   
 If not epexegetic, how else could ‘ta\ dokou~nta’ refer to the contents of mortal 
opinions?  One could understand these contents as the descriptions of the beliefs, or the 
meaning of the propositions, that mortals affirm accurately describe the world.  This can be 
done with a general understanding of the kind of things that mortals hold (e.g. “things change,” 
“there is generation,” etc.), or with the more particular focus on the Light/Night dualism 
introduced as the error of mortals in Opinion.73  At first, taking ‘ta\ dokou~nta’ to refer to some 
description of what mortals believe on my translation seems to result in the nonsensical claim 
that one will learn how “the things accepted/believed by mortals” should have been 
otherwise…just as being(s).  In what way could it make sense that the things mortals accept 
ought to acceptably be…as being(s)?   
 First, the manner of acceptance can be expounded—mortals do not accept these things 
as false, but as true.  They accept these things are the case, and thus these opinions are “things 
accepted (to be)”.  This predication of truth can be understood as part of the meaning of “ta\ 
dokou~nta”; or, one can explicitly read ei)~nai here as a providing the predicative existential or 
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 It is not clear how much sense this could make on any translation, frankly.  For an example reading along these 
lines, Owen’s has been most influential.  However, I deny the need to shift the discussion from first-hand to 
second-hand accounts here.  Also Taran as correctly criticized, there is no reason to think that this is from a mortal 
perspective—in fact, it cannot be, as mortals would not refer to things as ta\ dokou~nta, especially not in terms of 
Being, as I note above.  It is also worthy of noting that Owen is still relying on, and being led astray by, the 
problematic past obligation reading of xrh/n, which I believe has been adequately dismissed above.  Owen 88.  
Taran 211, fn. 21. 
73
 Many take the more general approach.  Owen and Palmer in particular adopt the latter association between ta\ 
dokou~nta and the Light/Night naming error. 
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veridical sense.74  All that is left to incorporate now is “xrh~n doki/mwv”.  It now seems that 
doki/mwv is most appropriately taken to adverbially modify xrh~n, meaning “acceptably ought to 
have been”.  Sketching this out, the goddess can now be understood as promising that, despite 
the untrustworthiness of mortal opinions, one will also learn the manner in which those very 
things mortals accept to be the case, would have been acceptable.  Translating this literally 
provides: 
 “But nevertheless, you will also learn these things—how the things accepted to be the 
case, acceptably ought to have been:  all things, altogether, just as being(s). 
 
However, this translation persists in suggesting the unfortunate implication that beliefs would 
have been acceptable if they actually were being(s).  The troubling element seems to be a lack 
of predicate adjective in the verbal phrase “acceptably ought to have been”—ought to have 
been what?    It cannot be “to be being(s)! So, in what way should the accepted things have 
been otherwise, in order to be acceptable?  The answer seems to require understanding the 
relevant context and repeating it again.  What mortals did accept should have been accepted in 
a different way—as being(s), or in terms of Being.  The subject phrase thus must also be the 
understood predicate of xrh~n, with the participial phrase epexegetically explaining the manner 
in which the “things that are accepted” ought to be acceptably accepted.  Incorporating this, 
the appropriate translation seems to be: 
 “But nevertheless, you will also learn these things—how the things accepted to be the 
case, acceptably ought to have been (accepted):  all things, altogether, just as being(s). 75 
                                                          
74
 Though the word order is somewhat strained reading ei)~nai in this way, and thus is not commonly adopted, it is 
certainly not impossible.  However, this objection is easily avoided by incorporating the existential/veridical 
qualifier into the participle itself. 
75
 My translation is most closely mirrored by M. Miller’s translation.  He is the only other commentator to suggest 
this additional existential/veridical conception in ta\ dokou~nta by his translation “what are deemed (to be).”  I 
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This translation has several advantages.  First, it takes tau~ta most naturally in the concessive 
context, looking backwards to ‘brotw~n do&caj’—despite their falsity, we will also learn about 
how mortal opinions could have been true—if mortals understood the truth, in terms of 
Being.76  Understanding ta\ dokou~nta as the contents of mortal opinions, maintains the central 
family meaning of the dok- words throughout these lines—“cognitive acceptance.”  Finally, it 
maintains the epistemic emphasis that was so clear in the previous contextual lines (28b-30)—
what should be believed to be the case—while introducing the ontological subject of Being as 
the standard by which the world is to be known according to Truth.  What we find in these lines 
on this translation is “the transition from mortal beliefs to ontological truth,” as Thanassas aptly 
avers.77   
 The final possibility must now be considered, however—that ta\ dokou~nta refers not to 
what mortals believe to be the case (or “to exist”), but to objects that mortals believe to exist.  
It seems possible to maintain all the elements of the translation above for the contents of 
mortal opinions, but simply change “things accepted to be the case” to “things accepted to 
exist.”  This reading results in an increased ontological focus over the epistemological, but if 
tau~ta is still understood as pointing backwards, and the subject of the clause is the “things 
that mortals accept to exist” the sense of cognitive acceptance is not wholly lost, allowing for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
only wish I had read his translation earlier, as it likely would have made arriving at my own independent adoption 
of this sense far less onerous. 
76
 Whether one wants to count this as a further thing to learn about both mortal opinions and truth—the 
relationship between them—and thus maintain that there are only two things to be learnt by the youth, or count 
this as a new, third thing on the list of lessons, hardly matters.  The key is that what is to be learnt is some 
epistemic and veridical relationship between the two.  What should not be done is to count this as a third thing to 
be learnt, and conflate this negative reading with the more positive views that also insist a third lesson is on offer. 
77
 Thanassas 25. Emphasis in the original.  Recall that the absolutive construction of o)/nta is also Thanassas’, so this 
is consistent with that reading.  Thanassas and I differ in our further interpretations over the relationship between 
Truth and Opinion, however. 
35 
the counterfactual xrh/n to still be understood in terms of “should have accepted otherwise.”  
In some ways, this understanding of ta\ dokou~nta is even more attractive on my translation 
than the one above, as it is very easy to understand mortals misunderstanding what exists, by 
failing to accept existing things in terms of Being.  Perhaps some commentators even have this 
in reading in mind.  However, the explicit attention to these details in the literature is quite 
lacking, and this clearly does not seem to be what the vast majority of writers have in mind 
when they take ta\ dokou~nta to refer to the objects of opinion.  
 Instead, scholars who adopt this view almost invariably adopt a very different 
translation of ta\ dokou~nta, reading “things that seem,” or “appearances.”  While these are still 
things that seem or appear to mortals, the association with mortals and their cognitive 
acceptance is now secondary.  The emphasis on this view is almost entirely existential, with the 
focus on things, not what mortals think about these things.  Since the objects of mortal opinions 
(on this view), are distinct, objective things in the world, we do get a change of subject from 
line 30, and a third thing to learn.  Thus, tau~ta must be read as pointing forwards here.  It 
should also be noted that the shared family meaning of the dok- words is interrupted in the 
middle, as mere “appearances” do not adequately capture the sense of “cognitive acceptance” 
advocated above, in which one holds a well-grounded view based upon significant 
consideration. 78 Losing this sense of “acceptance” wrecks the reasoning behind my translation: 
 “But nevertheless, you will also learn these (upcoming) things—how the things that 
 seem to exist, acceptably ought to have (seemed) to be (in the past):  all things, 
 altogether, just as being(s).” 
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 For extensive discussion of the “cognitive acceptance” view of dok- words, see: Mourelatos (2008) 195-205.  For 
extensive discussion of the anachronistic charge to the translation, see:  Cordero (2010) 236-7, and (2004) 152-
155. 
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While it may make sense to say that the things that seem really are, in fact, being(s), this sense 
cannot be brought out of the translation.   It certainly doesn’t seem right that the 
counterfactual here could be that the ways things seemed to be should have been, or seemed 
otherwise, in the past—or that appearances should have appeared other than they actually do 
(or did) appear.  This concern is not avoided by mere syntactical rearrangement, either.  
Consider:  “how the appearances ought to have been, to be acceptably…just as being(s)”, or 
“…how it would have been right for the things that seem, to be…just as being(s).  Again, it 
would not be correct to claim that the appearances themselves should have been otherwise.  
Trying to make such a translation say something sensible requires far too much interpretative 
work for it to be plausible. While one might object “so much the worse for your translation,” 
the inconsistency with my particular interpretative commitments above is not the only reason 
to reject such a reading. 
 First, translating “appearances” (or “things that seem”) is probably anachronistic.  It is 
unlikely that dok- words possessed this connotation this early in the Greek corpus.  The rather 
negative connotation in dok- words (“untrustworthiness”) concerning mortal views, describing 
mere beliefs about what was apparent to the senses, but distinct from fundamental reality, is 
generally thought to be a later Sophistic use, employed most extensively and famously by Plato.  
 Even if one is not convinced that such an early use of “appearances” for dok- words is 
anachronistic, the oft-associated interpretative view—that Parmenides allows for “gradations 
of reality,” so that there is the “really real” world of Truth, and then a “second best” account of 
the apparent world—almost certainly relies on imposing a Platonic view on this earlier text.  
While it is clear that Plato was influenced by Parmenides, the history of philosophy has to wait 
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for Plato to make the epistemic distinctions between true knowledge, falsehood, and correct 
opinion (and the corresponding ontological degrees this epistemic trichotomy suggests).  As 
Taran, Coredero, and Owen have all pointed out, the dualistic elements in Parmenides are 
pervasive and undeniable—there is no room for “degrees of reality” in his view.  There is only 
one object of inquiry—“that which is, and cannot not be”.  What is-not, cannot be, and cannot 
be thought of.  The arguments in Truth accurately describe this single reality; the mistaken 
dualism upon which mortals name opposites leads them to provide false descriptions of this 
one and only reality.  There are no gradations of reality, no distinction between a “really real” 
truth, and the “world of appearances,” or things which simultaneously “are and are not.”  There 
are simply correct and incorrect accounts of the one real world. 79   This should be evident to 
close readers of the text itself.  It should be even more clear if one is familiar with Plato’s own 
treatment of Parmenides—as one who denies any reality whatsoever to non-being, since Being 
is all there is.80  That such views are so pervasive likely says more about the influence Plato has 
had upon us, and the excessive speculations of some commentators committed to finding 
something positive in Opinion (especially in those “rogue” fragments), wanting to avoid the 
conclusion that Parmenides was so “mad” as to deny the entire world of appearances—
including his own existence—than it does about Parmenides’ own views 
 Given these considerations, it now seems clear that tau~ta should be taken as pointing 
backwards, and that ta\ dokou~nta picks up and continues the discussion of mortal opinions.  I 
leave the question whether this should be understood as the contents (“things accepted to be 
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 For some notable discussion on Parmenides’ dualism and there being “no middle ground,” see:  Cordero (2004) 
152-155; Charles Kahn, “The Thesis of Parmenides,” The Review of Metaphsyics 22.4 (1969) 700-724. 722; Long 99-
100; Austin Scott, “Parmenides and Ultimate Reality,” Ultimate Reality and Meaning 7 (1984):  220-232, 230-32.  
Taran 207-209, 221-222 fn. 51, 223-230; Owen (1960) 86 
80
 Taran 269-278.   
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the case”) or objects (“things accepted to exist”) of mortal opinion open, while denying the 
Platonizing translation of “appearances” or “seeming.”  With this major piece of the puzzle 
having been settled upon, my translation of lines 31-32 can be finalized, with the generic “to 
be” standing in for the ambiguity between the epistemic contents and existential objects 
emphasis.   
 “But nevertheless, you will also learn these things—how the things accepted to be, 
 acceptably ought to have been accepted:  all things, altogether, just as being(s). 81 
 
Or, more fleshed out, to eliminate (most) ambiguities: 
 
 “But nevertheless (despite the lack of genuine trustworthiness of mortal opinions), you 
will also learn these things about them:  in what way the things in the world accepted by 
mortals to be should have been accepted to be, to be accepted in an acceptable 




 I take it that my negative translation of these lines, while denying some especially strong 
positive accounts of Opinion, remains generally open between the positive and negative 
interpretative views.  Though the negative reading is far more natural—mortal beliefs are false, 
and the things they have believed, should no longer be believed; they should modify all their 
beliefs to align with the parameters of Being, as established in Truth—it is not required.  One 
could still hold that there is some positive account on offer in Opinion, which provides an 
account of the changing plurality we experience in the world, yet is simultaneously consistent 
with Being.  Additional evidence external to DK 1.31-32 must now be considered to resolve this 
dilemma. 
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 My translation is most closely mirrored by M. Miller’s translation.  He is the only other commentator to suggest, 
by his translation “what are deemed (to be),” that ei)~nai is to be taken as a predicate adjective for ta\ dokou~nta; or 
at the very least, the existential sense is understood in the contextual meaning of ta\ dokou~nta. 
39 
 
Challenges for the “Positive” Reading—Orthodox Arrangement:  
 As the Platonic interpretation, and its accompanying translation of “appearances” for ta\ 
dokou~nta have been adequately dealt with above, I will say nothing further on this mistaken 
view here.  Instead, I will address the problems that any positive account of Opinion faces in 
general.  Let it be noted up-front that while it may very well be true that we live in a world full 
of change and plurality, and that some account of this world as it is would be expected, it 
simply does not follow that any treatment by Parmenides of the world we experience would be 
positively endorsed.   
 Less anachronistic than Platonic arguments, but equally problematic, are positive 
accounts arguing that descriptions of the apparent world by mortals are in some sense 
“acceptable” for humans, qua human beings, while truth remains at the divine level.  This view 
falls flat on its face.  While in the past mortals may only have been able to provide sensible 
accounts of the world, truth has been revealed to mortals by Parmenides poem.  So, it is plainly 
wrong to continue to claim that it is “acceptable” for mortals to continue thinking about reality 
in their mistaken ways, when truth is accessible to mortals, and they (the youth and the reader 
of the poem) are learning it!   
 More broadly, all positive views face significant charges of inconsistency within the text 
itself.  Given the extensive, explicit, and (apparently) universally derisive treatment of “mortal 
opinions” throughout the poem, the defender of a positive reading must explain how such a 
view could possibly be consistent with the poem overall.  While a negative treatment in one 
area of the poem does not necessarily prevent a more positive treatment elsewhere, the lack of 
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any clear and explicit change in treatment makes the positive case extremely unlikely.  A quick 
survey of the treatment of the “opinions of mortals” found throughout the rest of the poem 
makes this challenge clear. 
  Let lines 31-32 be considered ambiguous in terms of a positive or negative 
recommendation for Opinion in general.  It has already been established that DK. 1.30 has 
clearly negative, epistemic connotations for mortal opinions, as do the Light/Night fragments 
that begin (and apparently end) Opinion (DK 8.50-61, 9, 19).  However, these are not the only 
places in the poem where mortal beliefs are clearly and explicitly derided.   
 At DK. 6, the goddess warns the youth from the path which: 
  “mortals with no understanding stray two-headed, for perplexity in their own breasts 
directs their mind astray, and they are borne on deaf and blind alike in bewilderment, 
people without judgement, by whom this has been accepted as both being and not 
being the same and not the same, and for all of whom their journey turns backwards 
again.”82 
 
 Frag. B7 offers a similarly scathing criticism of mortal’s tendency to relying upon their 
senses, rather than reason alone: 
 “But do keep your thought from this way of enquiry.  And let not habit do violence to 
you on the empirical way of exercising an unseeing eye and a noisy ear and tongue, but 
decide by discourse the controversial test enjoined by me.”83 
 
 Only at DK.8.60-61, when the goddess provides her explicit rationale for providing the 
youth her deceptive, yet “entirely fitting” (e0oiko&ta pa&nta—“likely,” “fitting,” or “probable”) 
account, is there any possibility for a positive recommendation related to Opinion.   
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 Coxon’s translation.  h4n dh_ brotoi\ ei0do&tej ou)de\n / pla&zontai di/kranoi: a)mhxani/h ga_r e0n au)tw~n / 
  sth&qesin i0qu&nei plakto_n no&on: oi9 de\ forou~ntai / kwfoi\ o(mw~j tufloi/ te, teqhpo&tej, a1krita fu~la, / oi[j 
to_ pe/lein te kai\ ou)k ei]nai tau)to_n neno&mistai (15) / kou) tau)to&n, pa&ntwn de\ pali/ntropo&j e0sti ke/leuqoj. 
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 Coxon’s translation.  a)lla_ su_ th~sd' a)f' o(dou~ dizh&sioj ei]rge no&hma / mhde/ s' e1qoj polu&peiron o(do_n kata_ 




  to&n soi e0gw_ dia&kosmon e0oiko&ta pa&nta fati/zw,  (8.60) 
  w(j ou) mh& pote/ ti/j se brotw~n gnw&mh parela&ssh|. 
 
 
  “This order of things I declare to you to be likely in its entirety,  
  in such a way that never shall any mortal outstrip you in practical judgement” 
 
Those who are attracted to the more “positive” view of DK 1.31-32 and Opinion take “e0oiko&ta 
pa&nta” as indicating that Parmenides is about to provide an account of the apparent world 
that is “acceptable” in some way (perhaps his own, personally endorsed physics and 
cosmology).  Even if this reading of ‘e0oiko&ta pa&nta’ were granted, since DK 1.31-32 can only 
be seen to support this view retrospectively, DK. 8.60-61 would be the sole outlier in the text 
explicitly providing any sort of positive recommendation of an account based upon Opinion.  
Thus, this argument is tenuous at best, and the charge of inconsistency remains strong. 
 However, there is no good reason to accept this reading of ‘e0oiko&ta pa&nta’.  The sense 
of this passage in context clearly seems to be that the goddess is didactically providing the 
youth with the most “likely” of mortal accounts that one might come across—perhaps one that 
is the most intellectually tempting—yet still ultimately mistaken.  The goddess explicitly 
provides her reasoning for providing such a deceptive, yet tempting account—so that the youth 
will never be surpassed in judgment by any mortal.84  There is no positive, Parmenides’ 
endorsed, “second-best” account that is promised here, or even hinted at.  It is an account that 
explains the basic errors of mortals (naming opposites), wrapped in a familiar cosmogonical and 
theogonical shroud which mortals are accustomed to accepting as true. This understanding 
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 to&n soi e0gw_ dia&kosmon e0oiko&ta pa&nta fati/zw, w(j ou) mh& pote/ ti/j se brotw~n gnw&mh parela&sshi. 
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seems obvious contextually, and has the further recommendation of remaining consistent with 
the otherwise negative treatment of mortal opinions elsewhere. 
 Are there not any further reasons to think a positive account of the apparent world, 
distinct from the opinions of mortals, might be on offer in Parmenides’ poem?  Is it really not 
the case that a third thing to learn might not be on offer?  It should be admitted that in DK 6.3-
9, there is good reason to think a third “path of inquiry” has been introduced—the one which 
mortals mindlessly wander, thinking things both are and are-not.  While the number of ways of 
inquiry and their relationship to different parts of the poem is a very important question in 
Parmenidean scholarship, I do not have room here to fully discuss the issue.  However, I hold if 
one wants to point to this passage at all, whatever distinctions one might make regarding its 
relation to the “ways of inquiry” in terms of number), that this “mixed path,” which mortals 
mindlessly wander, holding that things both are and are-not, must clearly be associated with 
the naming errors in Opinion.  Thus, it simply will not help any positive account of DK 1.31-32 
that finds three things to be learnt (with the third supposedly being positive), to try and relate 
this lesson to a supposedly coordinate third “path of inquiry”— when that passage contains the 
most unabashedly negative criticism to be found of mortal opinions in the entire poem.  Thus, I 
freely grant any hypothetical commentator who wants to appeal to the “third way of inquiry” 
as a premise, as I cannot conceive of how this might support a positive reading of DK 1.31-32 or 
“save” Opinion in any way—the negative treatment can only support the negative reading. 85   
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 I generally find Long’s view on this issue attractive.  A.A. Long, “The Principles of Parmenides’ Cosmogony,” 
Phronesis, 8.2 (1963): 90-107.  Also, Cf. my fn. 76—I am open to my view introducing a third thing to be learnt.  
Thus, even if it is admitted that there are three “paths of inquiry,” I could far more easily incorporate it into my 
negative reading of DK 1.31-32, without the tension the positive views face. 
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 But, what about those “rogue” fragments?   Certainly they suggest that a more positive 
account is on offer, right?  I will have more to say on these when considering arguments for 
moving these out of Opinion.  However, it should be noted that even without moving these 
fragments elsewhere, they are no serious challenge for the negative view.  It should be noted 
first that, as we have them, out of context as they are, it should not be assumed that these 
passages are positively endorsed or “acceptable” in any way, as they could have been criticized 
at any point in the lines that are missing.  Even more problematic for the positive view is that, 
on the traditional arrangement, the context implied by this very arrangement makes all of these 
passages negative!  Since these supposedly “positively endorsed,” “best account” passages are 
book-ended by the clearly negative Light/Night naming error of mortals, their context is framed 
by an explicitly negative exposition of mortal errors! 
Challenges for the “Negative” Reading—Orthodox Arrangement: 
 The negative view suffers from none of these shortcomings.  There is no tension in 
consistency between negative descriptions of mortal opinion elsewhere, and DK. 1.31-32, as 
there is no positive “saving” of mortal opinion—they are false throughout, and there is nothing 
“acceptable” about them as they are.  That things in the world would only acceptably be 
accepted if understood in terms of Being, this reading has the virtue of taking the arguments in 
Truth seriously, while accounts of Opinion that claim there are “acceptable” descriptions of 
change and becoming do not.  There are no worries of Platonic two-world anachronism, and 
the translation “things that are accepted by mortals to be” does not depend upon dok- words 
possessing negative connotations about “appearances” so early in the philosophical tradition.  
 On the other hand, there are some other puzzling challenges that the positive view 
44 
could more easily avoid, or better account for.  First, one may object that the negative view 
supports the traditional material monist interpretation of Parmindes’—that there really is just 
one Being, and nothing else in the world.  This view has the upshot of Parmenides’ argument 
denying not only the entirety of the rest of the world, but his own existence!  Was he truly so 
“mad” as to do this?   
 I do not find this to be a particularly strong objection.  First, as noted above, while the 
negative reading is admittedly consistent with the material monist interpretation, it certainly 
does not require it.  The negative reading is committed to denying any positive account of 
Opinion exists in Parmenides’ poem, or was intended by Parmenides himself.  Even if one 
argues that Parmenides’ views on the number of Being might ultimately be consistent with 
pluralistic accounts of the world as humans experience it, it does not follow that this was what 
he was expounding in Opinion.86  Instead, it is merely claimed that Parmenides is not providing 
such an account in the section of his poem we refer to as Opinion.   
 Finally, even if the more radical monist approaches are advocated by supporters of the 
negative reading, this is not as unlikely (or “mad”) as it might seem at first.  Parmenides’ views 
were apparently understood in some way similar to this by those closest to his time period and 
most familiar with his philosophy—Zeno, Melissus, Plato.  As to whether this would take a 
deluded mind to even consider such a radical position, it may just be that Miller was correct:  as 
ridiculous—even mad!—as this self-denying conclusion may seem—we may just have to accept 
that Parmenides was (as Miller describes Plato’s view of him), a “philosopher whose nobility of 
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 Here, I am considering the later works of Curd, and responses to Parmenides that took his arguments for 
ungenerated, changeless Being seriously, while developing pluralistic accounts that explain the world of motion.   
My point is, even if one thinks Parmenides did not outright deny these accounts, and did not favor the strict 
numerical monism he is traditionally thought to have championed, it does not mean that Parmenides was 
providing such an account in Opinion.   
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intellect drives him to accept conclusions, even if they oblige him to regard the obvious or 
trivial as nonsense, and even if they force him to throw away the ladder he has used to reach 
those conclusions.”87   
 Second, and more troubling for the negative view, I think, is that if there is really 
nothing positive to mortal opinion, and if Opinion were as lengthy as is suggested by its diverse 
claims, one must now explain why Parmenides would have written such an apparently 
extensive section (Opinion), with descriptions relying on the very phenomena completely 
dismissed as real in Truth.  While describing Opinion as “didactic” certainly seems correct, this 
explanation is not sufficient—one does not write extensive cosmogonies and theogonies based 
upon mistaken principles, just to make a point.88  Prima facie, it seems rather perverse that 
Parmenides, having completely denied motion, change, generation, etc. so succinctly in Truth, 
would then provide such a lengthy exposition dependent upon those very phenomena, as a 
demonstration of what is completely false.   
 I believe these worries can be best alleviated by considering some recent arguments for 
rearranging the fragments in the poem, which I briefly cover in the next section.  However, 
given all of this, and despite some lingering worries about the extent of Opinion, the negative 
reading seems clearly preferable on balance, even on the traditional arrangement of the poem.  
Thus, the negative reading should be accepted as the best view for DK 1.31-32, as things stand. 
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 Fred D. Miller, Jr.  “Parmenides on Mortal Belief,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 15.3 (1977):  253-265.  
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 This is Cordero’s explanation for Parmenides’ Opinion in his earlier book, before he proposed rearranging the 
text—I imagine the obvious lacking in this explanation, when confronted with the diversity and apparent length of 
Opinion, largely motivated his proposed rearrangement. 
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Part II:  How Might Arguments for Unorthodox Arrangements be Helpful 
Here? 
 
 I have argued that while the “negative” reading of lines 31-32 is more natural than the 
more “positive” reading--even on the traditional arrangement—it is understandable that some 
may remain unconvinced.  The primary concerns remaining to be addressed are the a) 
(apparently) extensive treatment of phenomena in Opinion that were resoundingly denied in 
Truth, as well as b) the “rogue” passages that many think should be understood in some 
positive way.  As suggested in the beginning, it may be that these tensions persist due to 
questionable assumptions regarding the traditional reconstruction of the poem, and these 
proposed rearrangements are the most obvious candidates for questioning those assumptions.  
While I will only be able to very briefly point to the implications of these new proposals, I 
believe there are elements in these arguments that, when properly understood and embraced, 
make the “negative” reading of lines 31-32 even more attractive than the orthodox 
composition and understanding has allowed.  The upshots of these arguments generally 
involve:  a) strengthening the divide between Truth and Opinion, in terms of veracity and 
falsehood, b) emphasizing the applicability of the conclusions in Truth to Opinion, and c) 
imposing a more restricted understanding of the scope and content of Opinion. 
Ebert’s Reconstruction: 
 Ebert’s proposed restoration is perhaps the most easily accepted, and though nothing is 
changed but a relatively minor transposition of text, it provides some of the best support for 
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the negative reading of DK 1.31-32 (and of Opinion in general).89  Ebert has rightly pointed out 
that DK. 8. 34-41 have nothing to do with the surrounding discussion.  DK. 8.42 picks up 
logically where 8.32-34 leave off, transitioning from discussion of Being’s static (or “unmoving”) 
attribution, to the need for the complete perfection of Being.  Lines 34-41, in their traditional 
position, seem to be a strange aside.  Lines 34-37 diverge into discussion of thought, and how 
thinking about something requires thinking about timeless Being.  Only the description of Being 
at DK. 38 as “complete” (ou)~lon) and “changeless” (a)ki/nhton) are relevant to the prior 
discussion in DK. 8, and support this traditional placement.  However, the thrust of lines 37-38 
is not in the form of making the argument that these are the characteristics of Being—it is 
already taken for granted that this has been established.   
 After this, in lines 39-41, it is claimed that everything besides Being, which mortals 
believe to be real, is “a name,” which includes the phenomena of coming-to-be, perishing, 
change in location, and the differences between darkness and light.  But this thought is left 
incomplete on the current arrangement (What is it to be “a name”?  Why is this important or 
relevant?).  However, when these lines are placed immediately after DK. 8.52 (just after the 
goddess has explicitly indicated she ceases discussion of Truth, and will now discuss mortal 
opinions with a deceptive (a)pathlo\n) arrangement of words), the discussion of mortals 
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 Though Ebert’s proposed restoration is relatively recent (1989), it was actually first proposed by Guido Calogero 
in 1937, though entirely ignored.  A.A. Long, in 1963, also noted the close relationship between these lines, but 
likewise appears entirely unaware of Calogero’s proposal.  Long  97-99.  My knowledge of Ebert’s (and Calogero’s) 
work is restricted to Palmer’s discussion in his monograph.  See Palmer, Appendix, 352-4. 
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naming dark and light things is immediately picked up again at DK 8.53-59.  Furthermore, DK 
8.34-41 provide an appropriate transition that is otherwise lacking between DK 8.52-53.90   
 Based upon Palmer’s analysis of Ebert’s restoration, I am convinced that it should be 
adopted.91  More importantly here, adopting this restoration makes the positive reading of DK. 
1.31-32 far more difficult (if not impossible) to maintain, thus greatly strengthening the case for 
the negative reading.  This placement makes it clear that the arguments in Truth must be 
carried over and applied to the entire next section (Opinion), and that the things in mortal 
opinions that contradict the arguments in Truth are not real—“for nothing else either is or will 
be except What is…”92  It is only in the mistaken opinions of mortals that generation, perishing, 
and change in location or brightness are to be found—not in reality.  These phenomena are 
nothing more than names mortals mistakenly impose upon Being itself.  DK 8.53 now clearly 
can be taken as explaining the way in which mortals come to make these errors, believing in 
generation, perishing, etc.—“For they fixed their minds on naming two forms…”93  Clearly, 
nothing between DK 8.50-59 (especially not after including lines 34-41 in the middle) can be 
taken in a positive manner, and since later fragments discussed above explicitly carry on this 
“naming error,” even to the end of the poem (DK. 19), it becomes exceedingly difficult to make 
room for a positive account in Opinion, one that shows how an account of the apparent world 
can be acceptably understood in terms of being, with its plurality and change maintained with 
some degree of actuality. 
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of the placements, under Palmer’s translation. 
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 Palmer is so convinced, he goes so far as to chastise all recent editions and commentators that continue to 
ignore Ebert’s arguments. 
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 The only remaining strategy I can see for the defender of the positive reading of DK 
1.31-32 (and a positive account in Opinion) is to divide up Opinion into compartmentalized 
sections.94  The positive-reader can accept that DK 8.50-59 are clearly negative, pointing out 
how mortals have erred.  They can then say that all the negative claims, and the applicability of 
the arguments of Truth to Opinion are confined to that section alone, and a new section of 
Opinion begins at DK 8.60-61—when the goddess says that she provides “this 
arrangement/ordering” (‘dia/kosmon’) which is “entirely fitting/likely (‘e)oiko/ta pa/nta 
dia/kosmon’), so that no mortal will outdo the youth in judgment.  After this, the defense will 
aver, we find some acceptably positive account, particularly in the “rogue” fragments, that does 
not deny the reality of the entire world.  
 It has already been pointed out that the context of the presentation of this “likely 
arrangement” points towards an exposition of errors which are provided didactically, so that 
the youth (or reader) will avoid these same metaphysical errors.  The context is not in favor of 
some positive, “second-best” account of reality.  Further, it should be noted that the verbal 
tense (fati/zw) here is present—so the passage is actually ambiguous on whether the “likely 
arrangement” refers to some future, positive account, or backwards to the clearly negative 
account just discussed.  More problematically, there are fragments that are normally placed 
after 8.60-61 that would be hard to deny carry on the naming error of mortals explicitly, 
supposedly up to the end of the entire poem (DK 19).  It would seem the positive view would 
require some rearranging (or convincing “restorations”) of its own before the positive section 
can be said to start here at DK 60-61.  Since Cordero has already offered some suggestions 
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 Thanassas interprets Opinion along these lines.   
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along these lines (admittedly from the more negative perspective), it is worth considering his 
position on the “rogue” fragments here. 
 
Cordero’s Rearrangment: 
 Cordero’s recent proposal consists of two primary points.  First, as we can be certain of 
the error of mortals involving the naming errors surround the forms Light/Night, we should 
restrict our understanding of Opinion to that context.  Second, the idea of Parmenides himself 
offering a positive account of the world of appearances is a fiction, reliant upon anachronistic 
Platonizing of Parmenides, leading to an “arbitrary” placement of the “rogue” fragments in 
Opinion, when they actually belong in Truth.  Given these background premises, Cordero wants 
to draw a line between cosmological and physical accounts (as part of Truth), and the fire/night 
naming error (the only contents of Opinion).  In brief, Cordero concludes that DK. 10-11, 13-15, 
and 17-18 should all be moved to Truth, in this basic order, and should precede DK 6.95  
Similarly, DK 16 should be placed between DK 6 and DK 7.96   
 The upshot of this argument for the negative reading of DK 1.31-32 should be clear.  
Were the physical and cosmological passages placed before the arguments for Being in Truth, 
this would provide a literal elenchus against which lines 31-32 could operate.  The goddess’ 
promise—that one will learn the manner in which accepted things should rightly be 
accepted…just as beings—would be explicitly satisfied in Truth.  For when the goddess a little 
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 Bicknell long ago argued that DK. 10 should be moved, from Opinion, to the end of the Proem, somewhere after 
DK 1.31-32.  While this sort of move makes some sense, and gets one of the lines that suggest a great length to 
Opinion out of that context, the argument depends upon its sister line, with essentially the same content, 
remaining in Opinion.  Whatever the merits of avoiding such gross repetition Bicknell has identified are, this move 
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32. 
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 Cordero 2010. 
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later tells the youth that he will come to know how the aether, stars, planets, moon, animals, 
deities, etc., came-to-be, and how the moon moves in its orbit, not only is there no need for an 
extensive account of this generation and locomotion necessary in Opinion, such is not needed 
in Truth either.  The upcoming arguments in DK 8 deny that any of these things actually ever 
happened at all.  That is what it is to really know about these things—that they are not. 
 Unfortunately, Cordero’s arguments for rearrangement are not only far from 
convincing, they are hardly tenable.  Cordero is surely guilty of overstating his case for the 
arbitrariness of the placement of these fragments in the Doxa, as the ancient testimonia are far 
from “arbitrary” grounds for the traditional arrangement.97  When ancient commentators, who 
had far better access to Parmenides work than any reconstruction we have now, tell us one 
passage precedes or follows another, this evidence is not to be ignored lightly.  Not only does 
Cordero seem to (almost) entirely ignore the testimonia, he even does so inconsistently.  The 
apparent inconsistency lies in his choice of passages to move and leave behind—by leaving DK 
12, his entire argument collapses quickly. 
 DK 12 does include mention of fire/night imagery.98  Since Cordero thinks only passages 
that invoke this dualism are to be assigned to Opinion, this may have been part of Cordero's 
reasoning for leaving it in Opinion.  However, DK 12 does not include any specific mention of 
the naming error.  Imagery related to fire and darkness/night is quite common in cosmological 
                                                          
97
 While I cannot extensively challenge Cordero’s arguments here, Kurfess has done an admirable job of pointing 
out how Cordero largely ignores and/or derides the scholarship behind the traditional arrangement.   
98
  ai9 ga_r steino&terai plh~nto puro_j a)krh&toio,  
  ai9 d' e0pi\ tai=j nukto&j, meta_ de\ flogo_j i3etai ai]sa: 
  e0n de\ me/swi tou&twn dai/mwn h4 pa&nta kuberna~i:   
  pa&nta ga_r <h4> stugeroi=o to&kou kai\ mi/cioj a1rxei  
  pe/mpous' a1rseni qh~lu migh~n to& t' e0nanti/on au}tij 
  a1rsen qhlute/rwi. 
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accounts (and we have already noted the Light/Night symbolism is evident in the Proem), and if 
we wanted to limit Opinion solely to the naming error, it could be left out.  However, doing so 
requires ignoring Simplicius’ explicit direction that this fragment comes after Truth—which is 
probably the other reason Cordero left it in Opinion.  However, once DK 12 is included in 
Opinion, and we take into account other testimonia (even from the same author, in the same 
passage), so it seems many of the other fragments Cordero wanted to move must also remain 
in Opinion, as their content is also in DK 12.   
 Simplicius clearly ties DK 12 & DK 13 closely together, one after the other, and the 
nameless divinity in DK 12 is taken to be the subject who creates the god of love in DK 13.99  
Not only does Cordero have a fragment with a cosmological theme in Opinion (DK 12), but the 
only fragment suggesting a theogony is to be found in Opinion (DK 13) should clearly 
accompany DK 12. After this, since this fragment also provides quite plausible links to the other 
assorted fragments that don't really go together otherwise, and the testimonia regularly relate 
these topics to Opinion, we have to add those related fragments back in.  For example, the 
goddess in DK 12 is also described as being responsible for initiating sexual unions.  Fittingly, DK 
17 & 18 also include this topic, and thus all the evidence points to them belonging in Opinion.    
Even the confusing DK 16 is related to hot/cold dualism by its ancient commentator 
(Theophrastus)--not far away in meaning from the Light/Night naming error!100 At the very 
least, one should conclude that wherever DK 12 goes, 13, 17, and 18 should follow. 
 What about the remainder (DK 10, 11, 14, 15)?  Is there still a case to move some of 
these to Truth as part of Parmenides’ physics instead of Opinion?  Not really.  Once again, 
                                                          
99
 Simplicius.  Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 39.  Coxon 238. 
100
 On the Senses 3.  Coxon 140. 
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Simplicius explicitly states that Parmenides begins his “treatment of the sensibles” with DK 
11.101  There have been arguments to move DK 10 to the end of the Proem before, but even 
were this granted, as DK 10 and 11 both promise knowledge of the generation of the cosmos, 
moving one is not sufficient to reduce the length and scope of Opinion, as the negative view 
seeks to do.102  Finally, though DK 14 and 15 do not receive any good attestation of their 
placement by Plutarch, since both make claims about the moon, and we are supposed to learn 
about the moon in DK 11, and since DK 12 can even be read as part of the cosmogony, there 
simply is no good case to be made here.  While such rearrangements might initially seem 
attractive for their explicit satisfaction of the promise in DK 1.31-32, at least on the negative 
view, accepting these moves requires ignoring all the evidence of arrangement from ancient 
commentators. 
Restricting the Doxa: 
 Cordero’s conclusion regarding rearrangement should be completely denied.  However, 
his argument is worth consideration.  Not only does he remind us that the poem’s 
reconstruction may be problematic (though clearly not as deeply flawed as he ends up 
suggesting), more importantly, he does make a very good case for insisting that we limit our 
understanding of Opinion to the context of the Light/Night naming error.  This does not require 
moving any fragments out of Opinion, however.  Instead, we should simply realize that all of the 
accounts in these “rogue” fragments can be understood in terms of further exposition along the 
Light/Night naming error, just as the traditional arrangement implicitly recognizes, by placing 
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 Commentary…On the Heavens 559.  Coxon 234. 
102
 Bicknell’s proposed move.  Cf. fn. 95 
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DK 19 at the end of the poem—which, as noted above, results in book-ending all of Opinion in 
the context of the clearly negative naming error of mortals.  But isn’t there still the worry about 
excessive length?  Why so much, if of no account? 
 Again, Opinion is to be taken didactically on the negative view, and so Parmenides sets 
out to give as full an account as he thinks is necessary to properly instruct his readers how to 
avoid the errors of mortals.  It may have to be admitted that since other theogonies and 
cosmogonies of his time were rather lengthy, and since he might have been modeling his 
account after them, excessive length may have just worked itself into this poem.  On the other 
hand, perhaps the entire supposition that Opinion would have required a lengthy explication in 
order to adequately address its myriad of disparate topics is a mistake.  Kurfess has recently 
argued, quite convincingly, I believe, that as there is no evidence of any additional content for 
Opinion amongst the testimonia, other than what we have in fragments.103  This suggests 
Opinion is not as extensive as it has traditionally been supposed.  With these considerations in 
hand, the negative reading of DK 1.31-32 is strengthened, along with the negative status of 
Opinion. 
 I have argued that DK 1.31-32 is best understood on the negative reading, both in-itself 
and with regard to the poem overall.  There is no positive account of Opinion being promised, 
and thus the status of Opinion remains thoroughly negative as well.  While this was 
demonstrated on the traditional arrangement of the poem, consideration of several proposals 
for rearranging the poem have, on balance, provided additional support for the negative 
reading.  These include recognizing that the arguments in Truth are explicitly applicable to 
                                                          
103
 177-189. One can take this general argument for a more limited Opinion without also accepting Kurfess’ 
association of the “rogue” fragments with a reincarnation myth, along the lines of Plato’s “Myth of Er.” 
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Opinion (Ebert’s Reconstruction); that Opinion should be understood in the only context we 
have certainty of (the Light/Night naming error); finally, I have noted how the worry that 
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Appendix A:  DK 1.28b-30—Variant Readings 
Context Lines (TLG) 
             …xrew_ de/ se pa&nta puqe/sqai            (28b) 
h)me\n  0Alhqei/hj eu)kukle/oj a)treme\j h}tor            (29) 
Line # 
Apparatus Criticus: 
Commentary on Selections 
Modern Endorsements 
28 
Greek is uncontested; 
all sources and manuscripts agree 
No discrepancies 
29 
h9 me\n--Plutarch     tw~ me\n/to\ me\n--Proclus. 
h9me\n--All other sources 
 
While h) me\n makes sense as a me\n…de\ construction, the feminine article fails 
to agree with the neuter subject (h}tor).  Though Proclus attempts to correct 
the gender mismatch, the epic conjunctions (h9me\n...h)de) are preferable. 
 
h9me\n is preferable (also preferable is h)de in line 30, for the same reasoning). 
No contemporary  
discrepancies. 
eu)fegge/ov-Proc. (bright; brilliant).   
Fitting metaphorical description of truth/reality, but almost certainly 
incorrect.  No modern commentators follow this reading. 
 
 eu)kukle/ov-Simpl. ("well-rounded"):  Supported by later physical description 
of reality DK 8.43-44),  
 
eu)peiqe/ov--All others (Plut., Sext., Clem., Diog.) 
eu)peiqe/sv provides the necessary, positive contrast to the lack of "genuine 
trustworthiness" found in line 30, and truth/reality is later explicitly 
associated with "persuasion" ("peiqou~v e\sti ke/leuqov") at DK 3.4 
 
eu)peiqe/sv is preferable contextually, and better attested. 
eu)kukle/ov is read by:  




 Palmer (2009),  
Taran (1965).   
 
eu)peiqe/sv is read by:  
Coxon (2009),  






a)treme\v--Sext. NLE 114, Clem., Procl., Simpl. 
 
The best contextual evidence for this reading is that Sextus further describes 
the _____ h}tor with the synonymous "unchanging foundation of knowledge" 
(to_ th~j e0pisth&mhj a)metaki/nhton bh~ma) (S.E. 144). 
 
a)treke\v--Plut. Sext. 111, Diog. 
 
While three manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus contain only a)treme\v, two 
manuscripts (both the earliest and latest) contain both words, but in opposite 
locations (111 and 114). 
 
a)treme\v is better attested, and thus preferable 
a)treme\v is universally 








Appendix A:  DK 1.28b-30—Variant Readings 
Context Lines (TLG) 
  h)de\ brotw~n do&caj, tai=j ou)k e1ni pi/stij a)lhqh&j.       (30) 
Line # 
Apparatus Criticus: 
Commentary on Selections 
Modern Endorsements 
30 
do&caj--Plutarch, Sextus (114, NE 111), Diogenes, Simplicius 
 f acc pl. 
do/cai--Sextus (111), Proclus (C) 
 f nom pl. 
do/caiv--Clement, Proclus (NP) 
(f. dat pl 
 
docav: is clearly preferable--need an accusative  
to be the object of puqe/sqai 
do&caj appears to be 








tai=v v. th~|v 
No important interpretative difference;  
both are dat. pl. forms agreeing with the preposition e1ni  
tai=j--is nearly universal. 
 
th~|v is read by Coxon, as the 
proper epic dat. pl. form.  
Palmer (2009) agrees.  Cf. 
Bryn Mawr text. 
 
ou)ke/ti--Diog.  This adverbial reading ("no longer") suggests temporal 
relativism in relation to truth conditions and/or persuasiveness 
(depending upon how pi/stij a)lhqh&j is understood), which is contrary 
to the overall gist of the poem.  
 
ou)k e1ni is attested by all other mss., and is contextually preferable 
All contemporary 
commentators  read ou)k e1ni 
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Appendix B:  DK 1.31-32 (Variant Readings) 
 
Thesis Lines (TLG): 
a)ll' e1mphj kai\ tau~ta maqh&seai, w(j ta_ dokou~nta     (31) 
  xrh~n doki/mwj ei]nai dia_ panto_j pa&nta perw~nta     (32) 
Line 
# 
Apparatus Criticus:Commentary on Selections Modern Endorsements 
31 
(manqa/nw) maqh&seai: 
2nd sg. fut. Epic. / 3rd sg. Fut. Mid. 
*The 3rd person future form is impossible in this context. 
 
(muqe/omai)  muqh&somai: 
1st sg fut ind mp / 1st st aor subj mp epic. 
*The aor subj. form is also impossible in this context.   
 
The future construction is technically possible, yet quite awkward:   
"Yet nevertheless, I myself will speak these things (to you), how..." 
 
maqh&seai is clearly preferable. 
continues the direct address of the Goddess to the youth,  
which  began at line DK 1.23 (me proshu/da...). 
maqh&seai appears to be 




Coxon provides no explanation for his emendation here.  I can only guess 




dokou~nta is preferable 
dokeu~nta--Coxon only.   
 
All others read dokou~nta 
32 
perw~nta:  Simplicius A 
 From pera/w.  Yields nonsensical translations once the verb's true 
meaning--"to pass through and leave behind"--is understood. 
 
per o)/nta: Simplicius DEF 
  Fittingly introduces the main topic of P.'s poem--Being, in th Proem. 
 
per o)/nta is clearly preferable 
perw~nta is read by:  
Cordero (2004)  
Coxon (2009),  
Geldard? (2007)  
Henn (2003),  
Taran (1965),  
Palmer (2009) 
 
per o)/nta is read by:  
Curd (2009),  
Lombardo (1982), McKirahan 
(2010), Mourelatos (2008), 
Owen (1960)  
Thanassas (2007),  
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Appendix C:  DK 1.31-32:   Modern Views on Greek Grammar & Translation 
Contemporary 
Commentator 

























Grammar of  
per? 
























"But, nevertheless, you will 
also learn this:  how it might 
have been necessary that 
things that appear in opinions 
really existed, ranging over 
everything incessantly." 
Coxon Backwards 







Past obligation "acceptance" perw~nta 
"Nevertheless you shall learn 
these also, how it was 
necessary that the things that 
are believed to be should 
have their being in general 
acceptance, ranging through 










Past obligation "be reliable" per o)/nta 
"But nevertheless you shall 
learn these things, too, how it 
was right that the things that 
seem be reliable, being 






Counterfactual "genuinely" perw~nta 
"How those opinions would 








Past obligation "acceptable" perw~nta 
"you must also learn how 
what seems (true to men had 
to be acceptable (to them)--
how its acceptance as valid 
was fitting and inevitable--
since this seeming penetrates 











Past obligation "geunine" perw~nta 
"But nevertheless you shall 
learn these things too, how 
the things which seem had to 




Appendix C:  DK 1.31-32:  Modern Views on Greek Grammar & Translation 
ContemporaryCommentator 























Translation:  DK 
1.31-32 
























you shall learn these 
as well, how for 
what are deemed [to 
be] 
It would have been 
right that they be 
eminently, just being 














this also you shall 
learn, how it would 
be right for things 
deemed acceptable 
to be acceptably:  













"still you will learn 
these things too, 
how what seems had 
to be real, being 
indeed the whole of 
things." 
G. E. L. Owen 
Backwards is  
best. 






Past obligation "acceptably" 
per o)/nta 
is preferable. 
"Still, you shall learn 
these things too, 
namely how the 
things-that-seem 
had to have genuine 
existence, being 





Appendix C:  DK 1.31-32:   Modern Views on Greek Grammar & Translation 
Contemporary 
Commentator 

























Grammar of  
per? 
Translation:   
DK 1.31-32 





Past obligation "acceptably" Leaves it open 
"how the appearances had 
to be perpetually and 
everywhere present in a 
way that assured their 
acceptance," 
or  
"how they [appearances] all 








Past obligation "actually" perw~nta 
"Nonetheless these things 
too you will learn, how what 
they resolved had actually 




in the sense of 




Past obligation "acceptable" perw~nta 
"Nevertheless you shall 
learn these [opinions] also, 
how the appearances, 
which pervade all things, 








Counterfactual "accepted" per o)/nta 
 "But nevertheless these 
you shall learn as well, how 
appearing things should be 
accepted:  all of them 















"Thou must learn it even so, 
That, testing all things, so 
thou may'st declare 
The Things that Seem, how 
men should judge they 
Are;" 
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Appendix D:  Variant Views on The Relationship Between Truth and Opinion 
Commentator 















 or  
Parmenides' 
Lines 31-32 & the Relationship Between  






Uncertain.  Two kinds of existence. 
 Truth is revealed by reason; permanent and unchanging 
(divine), 
Appearances are revealed by senses; ever changing and 
untrustworthy ( mortal). 
Being is real, appearances illusory.   
Asserts influence by Pindar and contemporaries. 
Implicitly denies Platonizing interpretation. 
Proem and knowledge tied up in imagery of religious 
revelation. 
Negative view of Opinion.   
Cherubin Unaddressed. Others' 
The account in Opinion shows the general 
misunderstandings that mortals are prone to, recognizing 
distinct objects in a changing world.  This account is 
contrary to all true inquiry and order.  However, humans--
being things in the world themselves that are mortal, 
come-to-be, change, and perish--it is inescapable, and thus 
"fitting," that mortals understand the world in these ways. 
Somewhat Positive view of Opinion. 
Cordero 2 Others' 
Opinions are false, but must be learnt--they can be 
deceptive, and can mislead one who does not know the 
truth.  Knowing what opinions are in contrast to truth helps 
guard the knowing person against deception.  
  
Account of Opinion presents a hypothetical alternative--
how the world would really be, IF the truth about being did 
not require what it does. 




Appendix D:  Variant Views on The Relationship Between Truth and Opinion 
Commentator 









things to learn. 
Whose 
Do/ca?Opinions 
of Others'? or 
Parmenides' 
Lines 31-32 & the Relationship Between Truth and 
Opinion 
Coxon 2 Parmenides' 
Parmenides' goddess promises to teach "how the 
empirical world must have its being in human acceptance 
and belief simply, and how this being is both acceptable 
and accepted universally." 
Coxon seems to both 1) take Parmenides' monism 
seriously, yet 2) simultaneously admit that Parmenides 
offers in Opinion an account of human experience, in the 
terms of that experience.  The account is not true, but 
maintains fidelity to that viewpoint. 




Truth sets forth the conditions for being.  All 
apparent/seeming things are dependent on Being.  
Opinion sets forth Parmenides' own cosmology, which is 
supposed to be consistent with a plurality of Parmenidean 
beings, and thus the cosmology is a "reliable" way of 
understanding the world. 





(mortals in  
general) 
The cosmogony of Opinion is a detailed, entirely false 
picture of reality.  This false account is to be identified 
with the mistaken way of inquiry discussed at DK 6.4-9, in 
which mortals take things to simultaneously be-and-not-
be.  DK 1.30-32 promise this negative account. 
 
Overall, Opinion is provides support for the arguments in 
Truth. First, by providing an exemplary example of mortal 
errors, so the reader will not be misled by such erroneous 
opiions in the future.  Second, by showing how all mortal 
accounts fail, this further supports, didactically, the 
arguments of Truth. 
 
  LIke Taran, Long takes the Light/Night dualism to be 
exemplarily reflective of the basic errors of all mortal 
accounts, which all fail by positing non-Being in as well as 
Being. 
Very Negative Account of Opinion. 
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Appendix D:  Variant Views on The Relationship Between Truth and Opinion 
Commentator 















 or  
Parmenides' 
Lines 31-32 & the Relationship Between  
Truth and Opinion 
McKirahan 2 Parmenides' 
Parmenides accepts the arguments in Truth.  The world as 
experienced is not true.  However, it deserves an account.  
Opinion is supposed to be the best possible account of the 
world as it appears to mortal.  Thus, it is valuable to that 
degree.  However, since it fails, and it is the best possible 
account, all accounts of the apparent world will also fail. 




Identifies ta\ dokou~nta with Light/Night, and argues that 
the error mortals make is thinking there is nothingness in 
them, when in fact there is not, as they form a unity 
together, and make each other what they are. 
 
Very Positive Account of Opinion 
Mourelatos 2   
We should not just realize mortal opinions are false, but we 
should learn about them and understand how accepted 
things would have to bein order to be true/exist (209) 
Explicitly denies the reading of "appearances" as a third 
thing to be learned.  Instead, what is to be learned is: "(a) 
"what it takes for dokou~nta to be genuinely or really; (b) 
what is the reason for saying that dokou~nta are not 
doki/mwv, as things are ( = among mortals)." 
 
Generally Negative Account of Opinion 
Nehamas 3 Parmenides' 
Parmenides is drawing the distinction between appearance 
and reality.  DK 1.31-32 explicitly describe the mistake of 
mortals, taking what appears to be as the way things 
actually are.  An accurate, correct description by 
Parmenides of the world of appearances is on offer in 
Opinion.  However, the world of appearances is not the real 
world.  To say things appear to change is possible, and 
Opinion gives such an account; it would be wrong to say 
things actually change. 
Somewhat Positive Account of Opinion 
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Appendix D:  Variant Views on The Relationship Between Truth and Opinion 
Commentator 















 or  
Parmenides' 
Lines 31-32 & the Relationship Between  
Truth and Opinion 
G.E.L. Owen 2 Parmenides' 
Lines 31-32 are an epexegetic account of what mortals 
themselves actually believe, which the goddess reports at 
second-hand--that they take the things they believe in (the 
two forms--Light and Night) to assuredly exist. 
 
However, the cosmology is still entirely false and illusory; 
Parmenides does not provide a positive account in Opinion.  
Owen's interpretation merely eliminates the apparent 
tension, by denying the goddess says anything positive 
about mortal opinions in DK 1.31-32. 
 
Very Negative Account of Opinion 
J. Owens 3 Parmenides' 
Parmenides' physical views in Opinion are his own, and to 
be taken seriously.  The world of appearances is not illusory, 
for this would be self-refuting.  While the world of change is 
misleading and not really true, it exists.  Lines 31-32 promise 
to explain how appearances had to be distributed 
throughout everything to be accepted, to exist genuinely.  
The perceptible world is the object of the entire poem--
Truth just reveals what all these things are really like, which 
is not revealed by our senses. 
 
Very Positive Account of Opinion. 
Palmer 3 Parmenides' 
Parmenides is not discussing the dualism of what exists and 
what does not exist, but the distinction between necessary 
being and contingent being.  The mistake of mortals is that 
by relying on their senses alone, they think that the only 
things that exist are contingent beings.  Only by reason does 
one recognize there must be necessary beings, and what 
such being would be like.   
 





Appendix D:  Variant Views on The Relationship Between Truth and Opinion 
Commentator 















 or  
Parmenides' 
Lines 31-32 & the Relationship Between  





DK 1.31-32 promise to relate how mortals come to be 
deceived, which is whenever they start naming distinct 
opposites, denying the unity of Being that all things belong 
to, and asserting plurality and change.  Opinion sets forth a 
minimum error (dualism instead of monism) that leads 
mortals to be mistaken.  However, mortals can learn truth. 
 
Very Negative View of Opinion 
Tarrant 
2 




Is skeptical that lines 31-32 are even genuine.  If they are, he 
thinks they do in fact suggest a positive account of 
"appearances" to be put forth, and how they had to exist in 
an "acceptable" manner, in a Platonic way; but, they aren't, 
so Parmenides is denying truth and reality to Opinion. 
 
Negative account of Parmenides' Opinion  






denies there is 
a unified doxa-
-many parts) 
The apparent world is the one in which we find Being, and 
understand it at all.  It is the sole object of inquiry.  Thus, to 
understand Being is not to discredit or eliminate the objects 
of experience.  Rather, Being belongs to the world.  Both 
ways of cognition (truth and opinion) are focused on the 
same objects.  Doxa understands these as appearances, 
Truth "as beings."  Also, seems sympathetic to Curd's view 
that Parmenides is allowing for a multiplicity of beings, as 
long as they meet the standards of being in-themselves, but 
not necessarily as complexes.   
2 parts of the poem are distinct and complementary kinds of 
inquiry.(82-83), one divine, the other human (84). 
Very Positive Account of Opinion 
Waterlow 3 Others 
P. is a strict monist.  Doxa presents a dualism that is false, 
where mortals err. 
Genuine, certain knowledge can only be achieve a priori; 
denies reliability to senses. 
Completely Negative Account of Opinion 
70 
 
Appendix E:  Ebert's Proposed Reconstruction (Palmer's Translation) 
DK 8.29-44a in Translation DK 8.50-59 in Translation 
Without lines 34-41 (Ebert) Without Lines 34-41 (Orthodox): 
And remaining the same, in the same place, and on its own 
it rests, 
and thus steadfast right there it remains; for powerful 
Necessity 
holds it in the bonds of a limit, which encloses it all 
around, 
Wherefore it is right that What Is be not unfulfilled; 
for it is not lacking:  if it were, it would lack everything.  
(33) 
(Where 34-41 traditionally are placed) 
But since there is a furthest limit, it is perfected    (42) 
from every side, like the bulk of a well-rounded globe, 
from the middle equal every way:  (44a) 
At this point I cease for you the trustworthy account and 
meditation (50) regarding true reality; from this point on mortal 
notions 
learn, listening to the deceptive order of my verses.  (52) 
(Where 34-41 should be, on Ebert's view) 
For they fixed their minds on naming two forms, (53) 
one of which it is not right to name, wherein they have wandered 
astray: 
but they distinguished things opposite in form and assigned them 
marks 
distinct from one another, for the one the etherial flame of fire, 
(56) 
being gentle, most light, every way the same as itself, 
yet not the same as the other; but that one is in itself 
the opposite, dark night, dense in form and heavy.  (59)  
With Lines 34-41 (Orthodox): With Lines 34-41 (Ebert): 
And remaining the same, in the same place, and on its own 
it rests, 
and thus steadfast right there it remains; for powerful 
Necessity 
holds it in the bonds of a limit, which encloses it all 
around, 
Wherefore it is right that What Is be not unfulfilled; 
for it is not lacking:  if it were, it would lack everything.  
(33) 
The same thing is both for understanding and that 
because of which there is understanding.  (34) 
For not without What Is, depending on which it has been 
expressed, 
Will you find understanding:  for nothing else either is or 
will be 
except What is, since Fate bound it 
to be whole and unmoved; to it all things have been give 
as names, 
all that mortals have stablished in their conviction that 
they are genuine, 
both coming to be and perishing, both being and not, 
and altering place and exchanging brilliant colour,  (41) 
But since there is a furthest limit, it is perfected    (42) 
from every side, like the bulk of a well-rounded globe, 
from the middle equal every way:  (44a) 
At this point I cease for you the trustworthy account and 
meditation (50) regarding true reality; from this point on mortal 
notions 
learn, listening to the deceptive order of my verses.  (52) 
The same thing is both for understanding and that because of 
which there is understanding.  (34) 
For not without What Is, depending on which it has been 
expressed, 
Will you find understanding:  for nothing else either is or will be 
except What is, since Fate bound it 
to be whole and unmoved; to it all things have been give as 
names, 
all that mortals have stablished in their conviction that they are 
genuine, 
both coming to be and perishing, both being and not, 
and altering place and exchanging brilliant colour,  (41) 
For they fixed their minds on naming two forms, (53) 
one of which it is not right to name, wherein they have wandered 
astray: 
but they distinguished things opposite in form and assigned them 
marks 
distinct from one another, for the one the etherial flame of fire, 
(56) 
being gentle, most light, every way the same as itself, 
yet not the same as the other; but that one is in itself 
the opposite, dark night, dense in form and heavy.  (59) 
